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INTRODUCTION 
or centuries, Anglo-American law has required culpability for 
criminal liability. Under one account, English common law began 
requiring culpability around the middle of the thirteenth century.1 
Originally, possibly under the influence of canon law, the common law 
simply required mens rea, thus asking only whether an actor had a 
guilty mind.2 The substance of that requirement varied little from one 
offense to another,3 and the common law generally demanded only that 
an actor have a state of mind characterized as a “vicious will” or an 
“intention to commit a crime.”4 Over the centuries, however, the 
common law came to require different mental states for different 
offenses.5 For example, larceny required an intent to steal, and arson 
required an intent to burn a dwelling.6 Hence, the common law is often 
1 Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the 
Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 655 (1993); Laurie L. Levenson, 
Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 435–36 
(1993); see also Evans v. State, 349 A.2d 300, 332 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975), aff’d, 362 
A.2d 629 (Md. 1976) (“By the middle of the 13th century, . . . the phrase ‘mens rea’ began
to take on significance in terms of ultimate criminal responsibility.”). There is no scholarly
consensus about the origin of the mens rea requirement, and some date it back as far as the
tenth century. See Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: III—The Rise and Fall
of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337, 338 n.4 (1989). Nevertheless, most agree
that, at a minimum, mens rea was “becoming necessary” by the middle of the thirteenth
century. Id.
2 Gardner, supra note 1, at 655. Some have questioned the influence of canon law on 
mens rea requirements. See, e.g., Guyora Binder, The Rhetoric of Motive and Intent, 6 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 7–14 (2002). The difference of opinion rests largely on whether the 
writings of Henry De Bracton influenced the early law of mens rea. See id. at 9–13.  
3 Gardner, supra note 1, at 667; Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in 
Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 
686 (1983); Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 988–89 (1932); cf. 
Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting “Apparent 
Innocence” in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1995) (“One with a ‘guilty 
mind’ was not necessarily one who was cognizant of wrongdoing but was simply one who 
had consciously made a choice—any choice—to which moral blame (or fault) could justly 
be assigned.”). 
4 Sayre, supra note 3, at 1023–24. 
5 Gardner, supra note 1, at 667; Pilcher, supra note 3, at 8; Robinson & Grall, supra note 
3, at 687. 
6 Gardner, supra note 1, at 668. 
F 
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described as evolving from requiring mens rea to requiring mentes 
reae.7  
Over time, the common law came to characterize most criminal 
offenses as requiring either “general intent” or “specific intent.”8 Both 
concepts have long been rightly criticized for being vague and 
confusing.9 The common law also developed numerous additional 
mentes reae for specific offenses, such as requiring a crime to 
be committed “willfully,” “maliciously,” “fraudulently,” or 
“feloniously.”10 These culpability terms also proved to be quite 
problematic,11 and, like general and specific intent, they generally 
applied to whole offenses rather than to specific elements.12  
In 1962, the American Law Institute (ALI) published the Model 
Penal Code (MPC or “the Code”).13 The MPC was a colossal 
undertaking, receiving funding from the Rockefeller Foundation,14 
enlisting many of the era’s greatest legal thinkers,15 resulting in thirteen 
7 Id. 
8 PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, CRIMINAL LAW § 4.1.1, at 154 (2d ed. 
2014).  
9 Eric A. Johnson, Understanding General and Specific Intent: Eight Things I Know for 
Sure, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 521 (2016); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE 
CRIMINAL LAW § 5.6(b) (3d ed. 2017); ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 8, § 4.1.1, at 154–
55. For example, “general intent” is a notoriously vague concept, and courts may easily
define the term more broadly or narrowly to achieve desired results for specific offenses or
cases. Robert Batey, Judicial Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, at Common Law and
Under the Model Penal Code, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 341, 367 (2001). “Specific intent” is
clearer but also subject to manipulation. Often, a court may define specific intent to require
purpose, knowledge, or some combination of purpose and knowledge. Id. at 380–81.
10 LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 5.1(a). 
11 Miguel Angel Méndez, A Sisyphean Task: The Common Law Approach to Mens Rea, 
28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 408 (1995). Some of these terms were eventually codified as 
states enacted criminal codes in the late 1800s, but the terms typically remained undefined. 
Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1100 
(1952). During the twentieth century, many states kept common-law culpability terms on 
the books even though they otherwise modernized their codes’ culpability requirements. 
PAUL H. ROBINSON, 1 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 61(b)(1) (1984) (“Many jurisdictions 
that have adopted the Model Penal Code’s scheme of precisely defined culpability terms, 
still use undefined culpability terms such as ‘carelessly,’ ‘heedlessly,’ ‘wanton,’ ‘wilful,’ 
‘intent,’ and ‘criminal negligence.’”). 
12 ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 8, § 4.1.1, at 155. 
13 MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).  
14 Sir Leon Radzinowicz, Herbert Wechsler’s Role in the Development of American 
Criminal Law and Penal Policy, 69 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1983). 
15 Harold Edgar, Herbert Wechsler and the Criminal Law: A Brief Tribute, 100 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1347, 1352–53 (2000).
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tentative drafts with extensive commentary,16 and requiring over a 
decade to complete.17 When the drafters began their work in 1951, 
Louisiana was the only state that had significantly reformed its criminal 
code during the twentieth century.18 The ALI succeeded where others 
had failed, and the Code’s publication quickly inspired a new wave of 
criminal code reform projects across America.19 In total, more than 
thirty states have adopted criminal codes influenced by the MPC.20 The 
Code’s greatest innovation is probably its General Part, which sets forth 
a series of general rules that apply to specific offenses defined in the 
Code’s Special Part. The most important rules appear in section 2.02, 
which sought to revolutionize the common-law requirements of mens 
rea and mentes reae. Section 2.02 has deservedly been called “the most 
significant and enduring achievement of the Code’s authors.”21  
Section 2.02 abandons both the common law’s vast array of 
culpability requirements and its distinction between general intent and 
specific intent. In their place, section 2.02 introduces four culpability 
levels: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.22 (Some 
states have altered the precise terms, most commonly by replacing 
“purpose” with “intent.”23) Significantly, section 2.02 also generally 
16 Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler’s Predecessors, 78 
COLUM. L. REV. 1098, 1140 (1978). Dean Kadish observes that the tentative drafts’ 
commentary “furnished a text that revitalized criminal law scholarship, provided a new 
starting point for writing in the field and profoundly influenced the materials and direction 
of criminal law study in American law schools.” Id. 
17 Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief 
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 323–24 (2007). 
18 Edgar, supra note 15, at 1353. 
19 Robinson & Dubber, supra note 17, at 326. 
20 In 1984, the MPC’s Chief Reporter, Herbert Wechsler, identified thirty-four state 
criminal codes as having been “influenced in some part by the positions taken by the Model 
Code.” MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, PART I: GENERAL PROVISIONS, at xi 
(AM. L. INST. 1985) [hereinafter MPC COMMENTARIES, PART I]. Professor Wechsler’s list 
included Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawai‘i, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and 
Wyoming. Id. The number of states influenced by the Code may be lower or higher, 
depending on how one counts. See Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1306, 1318 n.38 (2011) (“The MPC nose counting is complicated by the extent to
which some states have adopted it with changes. Depending on the extent of those changes,
some states are counted by some commentators as having adopted the MPC in whole, in
part, or only being ‘influenced’ by it.”).
21 Robinson & Grall, supra note 3, at 691. 
22 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).  
23 Dannye Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code’s Culpability Provisions on 
State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing the Mistake of Fact 
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requires culpability for “each material element of the offense,”24 
meaning that a given offense definition will include multiple 
culpability requirements.25 Paul Robinson and Michael Cahill have 
described this innovation as “a shift from offense analysis to element 
analysis.”26  
The MPC’s default culpability provision, section 2.02(3), plays a 
central but often overlooked role in the Code’s celebrated culpability 
scheme. Section 2.02(3) applies “[w]hen the culpability sufficient to 
establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law.”27 
If a statute is silent about the mental state required for a given element, 
section 2.02(3) “reads in”28—meaning that it imposes—a default 
culpability requirement of recklessness.29 Suppose, for example, that a 
criminal code defines criminal property damage to occur when a person 
“damages property of another.” Section 2.02(3) would apply because 
the offense definition fails to prescribe culpability requirements for any 
of the elements of the offense. Following section 2.02(3), a court would 
be required to read in the default requirement of recklessness for both 
the element of “damaging property” and the circumstance of the 
property belonging “to another.”30 Hence, an actor would not be liable 
for damaging property the actor reasonably believes to be his or her 
own, even if acting purposely.31 
Default culpability rules are important because criminal offenses 
routinely fail to prescribe culpability requirements. Without a default 
culpability rule like section 2.02(3), courts often interpret an offense’s 
silence about culpability as an authorization to impose strict liability. 
Unfortunately, the overwhelming majority of MPC states have failed 
to adopt default culpability provisions that are even substantially 
similar to section 2.02(3). Some MPC states never even enacted default 
culpability provisions, and numerous others have deviated from section 
Doctrine, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 229, 238 (1997) (finding that, as of 1997, approximately three-
quarters of MPC states used “intentionally” in place of “purposely”). 
24 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1).  
25 ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 8, § 4.1.1, at 155.  
26 Id.  
27 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3). 
28 Robinson & Grall, supra note 3, at 700.  
29 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3). 
30 This example is a little simplified. The requirement of “damaging property” 
technically consists of multiple elements including the actor’s conduct, the result of causing 
“damage,” and the attendant circumstance of the damaged item being “property.”  
31 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1)(a) (“[M]istake [precludes liability when it] 
negatives the . . . recklessness . . . required to establish a material element of the offense.”). 
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2.02(3) in ways that undermine the Code’s vision for criminal liability. 
Moreover, section 2.02(3) itself has some shortcomings when applied 
to real-world criminal statutes. 
In a previous survey, Professor Darryl Brown concluded that the 
MPC’s culpability presumptions “have had surprisingly little effect on 
courts that define mens rea requirements when interpreting criminal 
statutes.”32 I agree, at least with respect to section 2.02(3). The problem 
is that even MPC states have largely failed to enact strong presumptions 
of recklessness. In the absence of strong default rules, courts have 
found ways to circumvent the Code’s general requirement of 
culpability for each offense element. As a result, few American 
jurisdictions have yet to fully embrace the MPC’s culpability scheme.  
This Article examines section 2.02(3), both as proposed by the ALI 
and as modified by MPC states, and recommends new default 
culpability rules to replace it. Part I provides an overview of section 
2.02(3), explains its strengths and role in the MPC’s culpability 
scheme, and identifies its two main shortcomings. Next, Part II reviews 
the criminal codes and case law in the twenty-five states with 
culpability provisions influenced by the MPC; I find that even MPC 
states have largely deviated from section 2.02(3) in ways that 
significantly undermine the Code’s norm of requiring recklessness for 
each offense element. Finally, Part III recommends new default 
culpability rules that improve on section 2.02(3), prevent the problems 
experienced in MPC states, and establish a strong presumption of 
recklessness that works for real-world statutes. 
I 
THE MODEL PENAL CODE’S DEFAULT CULPABILITY PROVISION 
A. Overview of Section 2.02(3)
In introducing element analysis, the MPC’s drafters wanted to 
establish a norm of requiring at least recklessness for each element of 
an offense. Section 2.02(1) generally requires that a person act culpably 
“with respect to each material element of the offense.”33 The focus of 
this Article is section 2.02(3), which plays a critical role in enforcing 
the Code’s general requirement of culpability for each offense element. 
Section 2.02(3) acts as a default culpability provision for the Code, 
authorizing courts to read in a culpability requirement of recklessness 
32 Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Reform and the Persistence of Strict Liability, 62 
DUKE L.J. 285, 285 (2012).  
33 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1). 
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when an offense definition is silent about the mental state required for 
an offense element.34  
Section 2.02(3) states that when an offense fails to prescribe a 
culpability requirement for a given offense element, “such element is 
established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with 
respect thereto.”35 Under section 2.02(5), the Code’s culpability levels 
are hierarchical, such that purpose can satisfy a requirement of 
knowledge, and both purpose and knowledge can prove recklessness.36 
As a result, section 2.02(3) effectively requires recklessness for any 
offense element that lacks a stated culpability level.37 Recklessness 
demands, at a minimum, that the actor “consciously disregard[] a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will 
result from his conduct.”38 For example, suppose that a criminal code 
defines aggravated assault to occur when one “causes bodily harm to a 
police officer.” Note that the offense definition fails to state any 
culpability requirements at all. Under section 2.02(3), recklessness 
would be required for both the element of causing bodily harm and the 
circumstance of the victim being a police officer. Hence, under a proper 
application of section 2.02(3), an actor must at least consciously 
disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the victim is a police 
34 Section 2.02(4) also helps enforce section 2.02(1)’s requirement of culpability for 
each offense element. Section 2.02(4) provides that a prescribed culpability requirement 
usually applies “to all the material elements of the offense” if it is stated generally and 
“without distinguishing” between offense elements. For example, suppose that a criminal 
code defines aggravated assault as occurring when one “knowingly causes bodily harm to a 
police officer.” Note that the prescribed culpability requirement, knowledge, is stated 
generally and without distinguishing between the elements of the offense. Following section 
2.02(4), knowledge is required for both the element of causing bodily harm and the 
circumstance of the victim being a police officer. Courts have struggled applying section 
2.02(4). See Brown, supra note 32, at 297 (finding “widespread judicial endorsement of 
strict-liability elements” in MPC states and concluding that the Code’s culpability 
provisions “have had only modest effect”).  
35 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3). 
36 Id. § 2.02(5). 
37 In establishing recklessness as the Code’s default culpability level, the drafters 
reasoned that recklessness is “the most convenient norm for drafting purposes” because 
criminal statutes are traditionally explicit in requiring purpose or knowledge. MPC 
COMMENTARIES, PART I, supra note 20, § 2.02 cmt. 5, at 244. The drafters also rejected 
negligence as a default culpability level, calling it “an exceptional basis of liability.” Id. 
Hence, as with purpose and knowledge, a requirement of negligence must be explicitly 
stated. Id. 
38 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c). The MPC generally defines the four culpability 
levels with respect to the three types of objective elements—conduct, results, and attendant 
circumstances. See id. § 2.02(2). 
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officer. One would not commit the aggravated assault by assaulting a 
victim he or she reasonably believes to be a civilian.  
Significantly, section 2.02(3) does not provide any exceptions to the 
default culpability requirement of recklessness.39 Moreover, section 
2.02(1) recognizes only section 2.05 as an exception to the general rule 
that culpability is required for each offense element.40 Section 2.05, in 
turn, authorizes such “absolute” liability—or strict liability—only in 
extremely limited circumstances.41 In fact, section 2.05 permits 
absolute liability only for (1) offenses that constitute mere civil 
violations42 and (2) criminal offenses that appear outside the criminal 
code and for which “a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability 
. . . plainly appears.”43 Even when a legislature intends to impose 
absolute liability for a non-Code offense, section 2.05 automatically 
reduces the offense’s grade to a civil violation44 unless the non-Code 
offense was enacted after the Code.45 Hence, the drafters intended 
section 2.02(3) to apply to all existing criminal offenses, including ones 
that are defined outside a state’s criminal code.  
Section 2.02(3) affects numerous criminal offenses in the MPC. For 
example, the Code grades burglary as a second-degree felony when “it 
is perpetrated in the dwelling of another at night,”46 meaning that the 
actor must be at least reckless as to both the nature of a structure and 
the time of day.47 In fact, reviewing just property offenses, section 
2.02(3) requires recklessness for elements of nearly every such 
39 Id. § 2.02(3). 
40 Id. § 2.02(1). 
41 Id. § 2.05. 
42 Id. § 2.05(1)(a). A separate provision of the MPC explicitly states that violations are 
not criminal offenses. See id. § 1.04(5) (“An offense defined by this Code or by any other 
statute of this State constitutes a violation if it is so designated in this Code or in the law 
defining the offense or if no other sentence than a fine, or fine and forfeiture or other civil 
penalty is authorized upon conviction or if it is defined by a statute other than this Code that 
now provides that the offense shall not constitute a crime. A violation does not constitute a 
crime and conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage 
based on conviction of a criminal offense.”). 
43 Id. § 2.05(1)(b). 
44 Id. § 2.05(2)(a) (“[W]hen absolute liability is imposed with respect to any material 
element of an offense defined by a statute other than the Code and a conviction is based 
upon such liability, the offense constitutes a violation.”). 
45 Id. § 2.05(2) (providing an exception where a subsequent statute provides otherwise). 
46 MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2). 
47 MPC COMMENTARIES, PART I, supra note 20, § 2.02 cmt. 6, at 246; see also infra 
notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
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crime in the MPC, including arson,48 causing a catastrophe,49 criminal 
mischief,50 criminal trespass,51 robbery,52 theft,53 forgery,54 and 
tampering with records.55 For state criminal codes, a provision like 
section 2.02(3) stands to affect even more offenses simply because real-
world codes define so many more crimes.56 For example, from 1961 to 
2003, the Illinois Criminal Code mushroomed from 23,970 words to 
136,181 words,57 making it 5.7 times wordier than the original code.58 
Additionally, as of 2003, Illinois had 153,347 words of criminal 
offenses outside its Criminal Code, and that was reviewing only 
felonies.59 Almost twenty years later, countless criminal offenses in 
Illinois and elsewhere fail to prescribe culpability requirements for at 
least some offense elements.  
As a result, section 2.02(3) has significant implications for 
thousands of criminal offenses in current MPC jurisdictions alone. 
After all, section 2.02(3) helps identify an offense’s culpability 
requirements, which are offense elements60 required nationwide to 
48 MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1) (“A person is guilty of arson . . . if he starts a fire or 
causes an explosion . . . .”). 
49 Id. § 220.2(1) (“[A catastrophe occurs when one] causes by explosion, fire, flood, 
avalanche, collapse of building, release of poison gas, radioactive material or other harmful 
or destructive force or substance, or by any other means of causing potentially widespread 
injury or damage . . . .”). 
50 Id. § 220.3(1)(a) (“[Criminal mischief occurs when one] damages tangible property 
of another . . . in the employment of fire, explosives, or other dangerous means . . . .”). 
51 Id. § 221.2(1) (“A person commits [criminal trespass] . . . if [the offense] is committed 
in a dwelling at night.”). 
52 Id. § 222.1(1)(a) (defining robbery to occur when one commits theft and causes 
serious bodily injury to another person). 
53 Id. § 223.1(2)(a) (“Theft constitutes a felony of the third degree if the amount involved 
exceeds $500, or if the property stolen is a firearm, automobile, airplane, motorcycle, motor 
boat, or other motor-propelled vehicle . . . .”). 
54 Id. § 224.1(1)(a) (defining forgery to occur when one alters another’s writing without 
authority). 
55 Id. § 224.4 (“A person [is guilty of tampering with records] if he falsifies, destroys, 
removes or conceals any writing or record . . . .”). 
56 Douglas Husak, Crimes Outside the Core, 39 TULSA L. REV. 755, 768 (2004) (“The 
single most visible development in the substantive criminal law is that the sheer number of 
criminal offenses has grown exponentially.”). 
57 Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the 
States from Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 172 n.16 (2003). 
58 Id. at 172. 
59 Id. at 172 n.16. 
60 LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 1.8(b) n.14 (stating that, with the exception of strict-liability 
crimes, offense elements include culpability requirements).  
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be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.61 Indeed, the MPC defines 
“element of an offense” to include culpability requirements,62 and it 
requires that each offense element must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.63 In many cases, criminal liability will turn on whether an 
objective element requires recklessness, some other level of 
culpability, or no culpability at all. Hence, for many defendants, section 
2.02(3) can be the difference between guilt and innocence.  
B. Strengths of Section 2.02(3)
Section 2.02(3) has three main strengths in requiring at least 
recklessness for each element of an offense. First, the MPC is correct 
in generally requiring culpability for each element. That requirement is 
a hallmark of element analysis,64 which permits a criminal code to 
more finely calibrate an offense’s culpability requirements by requiring 
different mental states for different elements. Moreover, absolute 
liability as to an offense element is generally undesirable because, by 
definition, it punishes actors who lack blameworthiness as to that 
element.65 Some elements may ultimately matter more than others, 
given the nature of an offense or the facts of a case. Nevertheless, for 
default rules, it is most sensible to require culpability for each element. 
Such an approach best assures that only blameworthy offenders are 
punished. 
Second, the MPC correctly chooses recklessness as the default 
culpability level. The commentary states that section 2.02(3) codifies 
“what usually is regarded as the common law position,” and it 
accurately calls recklessness “the most convenient norm for drafting 
purposes.”66 Otherwise, the commentary does not directly justify the 
drafters’ preference for recklessness. The commentary shows much 
more concern for explaining why negligence liability is occasionally 
61 Id. § 1.8(b) (“It is everywhere agreed that the prosecution has the burden of proving 
. . . the existence of each element [of the offense] beyond a reasonable doubt.”).  
62 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9)(b) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) 
(“‘[E]lement of an offense’ means (i) such conduct or (ii) such attendant circumstances or 
(iii) such a result of conduct as . . . establishes the required kind of culpability . . . .”).
63 Id. § 1.12(12).
64 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 24, § 2.02(1).
65 See LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 5.5(c) (“For the most part, the commentators have been
critical of strict-liability crimes. ‘The consensus can be summarily stated: to punish conduct 
without reference to the actor’s state of mind is both inefficacious and unjust.’”) (quoting 
Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 109 (1962)). 
66 MPC COMMENTARIES, PART I, supra note 20, § 2.02 cmt. 5, at 244. 
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appropriate.67 Indeed, criminal law scholars continue to question 
whether the law should ever impose criminal liability based on an 
actor’s mere failure to perceive a risk.68 Given that debate, it seems 
imprudent to use negligence as a default culpability level. On the other 
hand, knowledge is too demanding to serve as a default culpability 
requirement, given that it requires the prosecution to prove that an actor 
was aware of the attendant circumstances and practically certain of the 
offense’s results.69 Recklessness provides a happy medium, then, 
because it punishes sufficiently blameworthy conduct without 
requiring prosecutors to prove too much. 
Third, the MPC properly confers little discretion to courts in 
deciding whether culpability is required for an element and what 
mental state is needed. As discussed later in this Article, several states 
read in a culpability requirement when an offense or element 
“necessarily involves” a mental state.70 That standard is unclear, as 
shown by the fact that it has taken on so many different meanings in 
the six states that have adopted it. In general, though, the requirement 
has allowed many courts to impose absolute liability under the theory 
67 See id. § 2.02 cmt. 4, at 243–44. 
68 See generally LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 5.4(a)(2) (“[T]here is something of a dispute 
as to whether criminal liability should, on principle, ever be based upon objective 
negligence.”). 
69 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
Additionally, courts may be more reluctant to apply a default culpability provision that 
requires reading in a mental state of knowledge. After all, when a statute is silent about the 
culpability required for an element, a court generally must choose between absolute liability 
and the default culpability level. That gap is greater when a criminal code sets the default at 
knowledge. Additionally, a default requirement of knowledge is more likely to cause 
interpretive problems because numerous criminal statutes are explicit in requiring 
knowledge. As a result, when interpreting an offense that is silent about culpability, it is 
more likely that a related provision will prescribe the default culpability requirement. That 
leads to obvious problems of legislative intent because it is so widely accepted that a 
legislature acts deliberately when it includes language in one provision but omits it from 
another. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the 
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the 
disparate inclusion or exclusion.”) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 
722 (5th Cir. 1972) (alteration in original)). My experience tells me that many courts would 
find ways to circumvent the default culpability provision, even if it does not provide a 
legislative-intent exception. Such problems are far less likely to occur if the default 
culpability level is recklessness. 
70 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(b) (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202(B) 
(2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-503(2) (2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.040 (West 
2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c)(3) (West 2020); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2) 
(McKinney 2019).  
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that offenses did not necessarily involve culpable mental states.71 
Similarly, several states permit courts to choose the mental state 
required for an element when an offense does not prescribe one. The 
resulting law is highly offense-specific, making offenses’ culpability 
requirements inconsistent and somewhat unpredictable.72 The MPC, in 
contrast, establishes a true default culpability requirement that guides 
courts, informs the public, and promotes uniformity between offenses. 
C. Shortcomings of Section 2.02(3)
In 1962, section 2.02(3) was well ahead of its time in reading 
culpability requirements into offense definitions. In fact, almost six 
decades later, the overwhelming majority of American criminal codes 
have yet to catch up, thus undermining the Code’s norm of requiring at 
least recklessness for each offense element. Some of the blame lies with 
section 2.02(3) itself, which was written more for the MPC’s own 
offenses than for real-world criminal statutes.  
This Section discusses two shortcomings of section 2.02(3) as 
applied to state criminal codes. First, the Code’s drafters simply did not 
anticipate the extent to which adopting states would continue to impose 
absolute liability for criminal offenses. Second, the MPC does not 
make it sufficiently clear that section 2.02(3) applies to all offense 
elements, including those that appear in grading provisions. 
1. Failing to Anticipate Absolute Liability for Serious Criminal
Offenses
The MPC did not anticipate the continued use of absolute liability 
for serious criminal offenses. The Code’s drafters addressed their 
aversion to absolute liability most clearly in the commentary for section 
2.05. As discussed above, section 2.05 authorizes absolute liability 
only for civil violations and for non-Code offenses that clearly indicate 
legislative intent to omit culpability requirements.73 The commentary 
describes section 2.05 as presenting a “frontal attack” on absolute 
liability by generally grading absolute-liability offenses as civil 
violations, rather than criminal offenses.74 The drafters firmly believed 
71 See infra notes 120–35 and accompanying text. 
72 See infra notes 142–59 and accompanying text. 
73 See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text. 
74 MPC COMMENTARIES, PART I, supra note 20, § 2.05 cmt. 1, at 283. Note that the 
MPC does permit criminal liability for non-Code offenses enacted after the Code. See 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05(2) (providing exception when a subsequent statute provides 
otherwise).  
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that the criminal law’s moral condemnation should be reserved for 
blameworthy defendants, deeming the principle “too fundamental to be 
compromised.”75  
In contrast, legislatures in MPC states have been quite willing to 
impose absolute liability even for serious offenses. Indeed, a strong 
majority of MPC jurisdictions authorize absolute liability for criminal 
offenses in their criminal codes.76 For those states, the MPC provides 
little guidance about how to impose absolute liability because the 
MPC’s drafters generally refused to budge on that critical issue.77 After 
all, section 2.05 fails to even acknowledge that criminal offenses in the 
Code may impose absolute liability, much less explain how to do so.78 
Moreover, section 2.02(3) does not provide any exceptions to its 
default culpability requirement of recklessness.79  
Without sufficient guidance from the MPC, many states have 
established their own exceptions to their default culpability 
provisions.80 The most common exception authorizes absolute 
75 MPC COMMENTARIES, PART I, supra note 20, § 2.05 cmt. 1, at 283. 
76 As discussed in Part II, twenty-five states have enacted culpability provisions 
influenced significantly by the MPC. See infra note 95 and accompanying text. Of those 
twenty-five states, seventeen have provisions acknowledging the possibility of absolute 
liability for criminal offenses in their criminal codes. See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(b) (2020); 
ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.600(b) (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202(B) (2020); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 18-1-502 (2020); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-9 (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
5203 (2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.050(1) (West 2020); ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 34(4) 
(2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 562.026(2) (2020); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-104 (2019); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c)(3) (West 2020); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2) (McKinney 2019); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(2), (3) (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B) (West
2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-301(b) (2020); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b) (West
2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102 (West 2020). Additionally, Connecticut and Indiana
do not explicitly address absolute liability offenses, but they do not need to because their
codes lack default culpability provisions. See discussion infra Section II.A.
77 Nevertheless, in Article 213, the MPC does allow for absolute liability with respect to 
a victim’s age for sexual offenses. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(1) (“Whenever in this 
Article the criminality of conduct depends on a child’s being below the age of 10, it is no 
defense that the actor did not know the child’s age, or reasonably believed the child to be 
older than 10. When criminality depends on the child’s being below a critical age other than 
10, it is a defense for the actor to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
reasonably believed the child to be above the critical age.”). 
78 See id. § 2.05(1)(a) (addressing absolute liability only for civil violations). 
79 See id. § 2.02(3). 
80 E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(b); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.600(b); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
2-204(c) (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 251(c)(2) (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-212
(2020); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-9; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5203; KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 501.050; MO. REV. STAT. § 562.026; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-104; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:2-2(c)(3); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B), (C);
OR. REV. STAT. § 161.105(1) (2020); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 305(a) (2020); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-11-301(b); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102.
56 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99, 43 
immunity based on legislative intent.81 As discussed later in Section 
II.D., adopting states’ legislative-intent exceptions significantly
undermine the Code’s culpability scheme.
2. Silence About Default Culpability Requirements for Grading
Provisions
The MPC also falls short because it does not make clear that section 
2.02(3) applies to offense elements that appear in grading provisions. 
Section 2.02(3) reads in recklessness when a statute fails to state a 
culpability requirement for any “material element of an offense.”82 
Section 1.13(10) defines a “material” element as one that has bearing 
on “(i) the harm or evil, incident to conduct, sought to be prevented by 
the law defining the offense, or (ii) the existence of a justification or 
excuse for such conduct.”83 As the Code’s commentary explains, an 
offense’s material elements therefore consist of its objective elements, 
which may require certain conduct, circumstances, or results.84 That is 
consistent with section 1.13(9), which defines an “element” to mean 
the required conduct, circumstances, or results.85  
Confusingly, though, the drafters assumed that all offense elements, 
including material elements, would appear only in an offense’s 
definition. Specifically, section 1.13(9) defines “element” to mean 
conduct, circumstances, or results that are “included . . . in the 
definition of the offense.”86 But it is unclear from the provision’s text 
whether an offense’s definition includes its grading provisions, which 
may impose their own requirements for aggravating an offense. 
Unfortunately, the commentary for section 1.13 also fails to directly 
address whether offense elements may appear in grading provisions. 
Compounding the problem, numerous MPC offenses seem to 
distinguish between provisions that define offenses and provisions that 
81 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(b); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.600(b)(2); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-2-204(c)(2); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 251(c)(2); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-
212(2); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-9; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5203(a), (b); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 501.050(2); MO. REV. STAT. § 562.026(2); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-104; N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c)(3); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2901.21(B); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.105(1)(b); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 305(a)(2); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-11-301(b); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-
102.
82 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3). 
83 Id. § 1.13(10). 
84 MPC COMMENTARIES, PART I, supra note 20, § 2.02 cmt. 1, at 229. 
85 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9). 
86 Id. 
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grade them. The latter are commonly titled “grading,” and the former 
are called “offense defined,” “definition,” and the like.87 
But elsewhere, the commentary makes clear that section 2.02(3) 
does apply to grading provisions. For example, section 223.1(2) grades 
theft according to the stolen property’s value but without prescribing a 
culpability requirement. The commentary for section 223.1 explicitly 
states that culpability is still required as to value because it is a 
“material element of the offense.”88 Moreover, because the offense 
fails to prescribe a culpability requirement, “the consequence under 
section 2.02(3) . . . is a minimum culpability standard of 
recklessness.”89 Similarly, the MPC grades burglary as a more serious 
offense when it is committed “in the dwelling of another at night.”90 
The commentary confirms that section 2.02(3) applies to those 
elements, thus imposing a culpability requirement of recklessness.91 It 
is unclear, however, how many states considered the MPC’s 
commentary when drafting their criminal codes. The official 
commentary was not fully published until 1985.92 By that point, the 
87 See, e.g., id. § 212.5 (criminal coercion); id. § 213.3 (corruption of minors and 
seduction); id. § 220.3 (criminal mischief); id. § 221.1 (burglary); id. § 222.1 (robbery); id. 
§ 224.1 (forgery); id. § 240.2 (threats and other improper influence in official and political
matters); id. § 241.8 (tampering with public records or information); id. § 242.6 (escape);
id. § 250.2 (disorderly conduct); id. § 251.2 (prostitution and related offenses).
88 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, PART II: DEFINITION OF SPECIFIC 
CRIMES, § 223.1 cmt. 3, at 144 (AM. L. INST., 1980) [hereinafter MPC COMMENTARIES, 
PART II] (“Since valuation is related to ‘the harm or evil . . . sought to be prevented by the 
law defining the offense,’ the dollar amounts that are specified in Subsections (2)(a) and 
(2)(b) are ‘material elements of the offense’ as that term is defined in Section 1.13(9) and 
(10) . . . . The culpability provisions of Section 2.02 thus are fully applicable to the values 
used to differentiate grades of theft.”). 
89 Id. 
90 MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2).  
91 MPC COMMENTARIES, PART I, supra note 20, § 2.02 cmt. 6, at 246 (“Must the actor 
know that he is entering a dwelling house in order to be convicted of a second degree felony, 
or is some lesser culpability level sufficient? Section 2.02(3) should control elements of this 
character, and therefore recklessness should suffice in the absence of special provision to 
the contrary.”); MPC COMMENTARIES PART II, supra note 88, § 221.1 cmt. 4, at 81 (“It 
should be noted finally that the phrase ‘dwelling of another at night’ relates to the ‘harm or 
evil . . . sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense’ and is thus a ‘material 
element’ of the offense of burglary as that term is used in Sections 1.13(9), 1.13(10), and 
2.02. The consequence is that a culpability level of recklessness is established by Section 
2.02(3) for this element and that mistakes by the defendant will be governed by the general 
provisions of Section 2.04.”). 
92 Robinson & Dubber, supra note 17, at 327. The Special Part commentary was 
published in 1980, and the General Part commentary was published in 1985. Id.  
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MPC had already been adopted, at least in part, in more than thirty 
states.93  
In any event, the MPC itself is silent about whether section 2.02(3) 
applies to offense elements that appear in grading provisions.94 As 
discussed in Section II.E., numerous states have exacerbated the 
Code’s problems by directly limiting their default culpability 
provisions to offense definitions. In deviating from the MPC in that 
way and others, states commonly permit absolute liability for serious 
criminal offenses. As a result, they have significantly weakened the 
Code’s central requirement of culpability for each offense element.  
II 
DEFAULT CULPABILITY PROVISIONS IN MODEL PENAL CODE STATES 
The overwhelming majority of MPC jurisdictions deviate 
significantly from the MPC, undermining the Code’s norm of requiring 
recklessness for each offense element. Twenty-five states have enacted 
culpability provisions influenced significantly by the MPC: Alabama, 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Hawai‘i, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, 
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah.95 Of those 
93 MPC COMMENTARIES, PART I, supra note 20, at xi. The Code’s official commentary 
was largely based on the drafters’ original commentary, id. at xli, which was written for 
tentative drafts of Code provisions published from 1953 to 1960, id. at xii. Even in some 
early-adopting states, then, drafters may have reviewed commentary for the Code that was 
substantially similar to the official commentary, but only if they had copies of the Code’s 
tentative drafts.  
94 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9) (defining “element of an offense”); id. § 2.02(3) 
(establishing default culpability of requirement of recklessness). 
95 See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-2-1 to -6 (2020); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.81.600–.620 (2019); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-201 to -204 (2020); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-201 to -206 
(2020); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-501 to -504 (2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-5 to -6 
(2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 251–64 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 702-204 to -220 
(2020); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-3 to 4-9 (2012); IND. CODE § 35-41-2-2 (2020); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5202 to -5204, -5207 (2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.010–.070 
(West 2020); ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, §§ 32–36 (2019); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 562.016–.031 
(2020); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101 to -104 (2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 626:2–
:3 (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:2-2 to -4 (West 2020); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 15.00–.20 
(McKinney 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-02-02- to -05 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 2901.20–.22 (West 2020); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.085–.115 (2020); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 302–05 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-11-301 to -302 (2020); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 6.02–.04 (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-2-102 to -104 (West 2020).
My list is the same as Professor Dannye Holley’s. See supra note 23, at 249–53. Darryl 
Brown used a similar list for his survey of states that have codified some form of sections 
2.02(3) and (4) of the MPC. See Brown, supra note 32, at 289 n.8. Professor Brown 
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twenty-five states, only a handful have default culpability rules that 
faithfully implement section 2.02(3).  
MPC jurisdictions have deviated from section 2.02(3) in five 
principal ways. First, some MPC states still have failed to adopt a 
default culpability provision like section 2.02(3). Second, even among 
the states that have such provisions, many do not require culpability for 
each offense element. Third, half of the states with default culpability 
provisions authorize a culpability level other than recklessness. Fourth, 
unlike the MPC, most states provide exceptions allowing for absolute 
liability based on legislative intent. Finally, most jurisdictions 
explicitly limit their default culpability provisions to elements that 
appear in offense definitions, thus excluding elements in grading 
provisions. I conclude this Part with a summary of states’ default 
culpability rules, ranking them from best to worst. 
A. States Without Default Culpability Provisions
Nearly sixty years after the MPC’s publication, most American 
criminal codes still lack a default culpability rule like section 2.02(3). 
Even among the twenty-five states with culpability provisions 
influenced by the MPC, three states—Connecticut, Indiana, and 
Maine—fail to impose culpability requirements unless they are 
explicitly stated.96 The Connecticut Penal Code goes so far as to 
identified twenty-four states with “general principles” or “rules of construction” influenced 
by sections 2.02(3) and (4). Id. My survey differs from Professor Brown’s only in including 
Montana. As Professor Brown noted, the Montana Criminal Code lacks a true read-in 
provision like section 2.02(3). Id. Nevertheless, Montana has enacted other culpability 
provisions influenced by the MPC. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101 (defining 
“knowingly,” “purposely,” and “negligently”); id. § 45-2-103 (establishing hierarchy for 
culpability levels); id. § 45-2-104 (stating requirements for absolute liability). Most 
significantly for purposes of this Article, Montana generally requires at least negligence 
“with respect to each element described by the statute defining the offense.” Id. § 45-2-
103(1). That requirement establishes a default culpability level of negligence even though it 
does not explicitly demand reading in a culpability requirement when an offense does not 
prescribe one.  
96 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-5; IND. CODE § 35-41-2-2; ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 34. 
New Hampshire also lacks a read-in provision similar to section 2.02(3). See N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 626:2–:3. But New Hampshire differs from Connecticut, Indiana, and Maine 
because its code requires at least negligence as to each objective element. Id. § 626:2(I) (“A 
person is guilty of murder, a felony, or a misdemeanor only if he acts purposely, knowingly, 
recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of 
the offense.”). As discussed in Section II.C, New Hampshire courts have interpreted this 
provision as authorizing them to choose their own culpability levels when offenses fail to 
prescribe them. See infra text accompanying notes 153–55. This Article therefore treats the 
New Hampshire statute as a default culpability rule, even though it does not directly require 
courts to read in unstated culpability requirements. Finally, three states read in culpability 
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disclaim a default culpability requirement, stating that when a mental 
state is required for a particular offense element, “such mental state is 
ordinarily designated in the statute defining the offense.”97 Similarly, 
the Maine Criminal Code requires culpability only “as the law defining 
the crime specifies.”98 
Countless offenses in American criminal codes fail to explicitly state 
culpability requirements for offense elements.99 Because only a 
minority of states have enacted a provision like section 2.02(3), most 
American courts interpret a statute’s silence about culpability to 
authorize absolute liability. Hence, most states have yet to fully 
embrace the MPC’s norm of requiring at least recklessness for each 
offense element.  
B. States Fail to Require Culpability for Each Offense Element
Even among the twenty-two states with default culpability rules
influenced by section 2.02(3),100 almost half fail to generally require 
culpability for each offense element. States have generally deviated 
from the MPC in two ways.  
First, several states’ default culpability provisions apply only when 
an offense fails to require any culpability at all. Under section 2.02(3), 
a culpability level of recklessness applies “[w]hen the culpability 
sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed 
by law.”101 Section 2.02(3) thus helps to enforce section 2.02(1), which 
generally requires culpability for each material element of the 
requirements only for certain classes of offenses. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.640 (limiting 
culpability provisions to offenses in the criminal code); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.050(1) 
(permitting absolute liability for misdemeanors when the applicable statute does not mention 
a “culpable mental state”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(1) (limiting culpability 
provisions to offenses in the criminal code). 
97 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-5.  
98 ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 34(1). 
99 Darryl K. Brown, Strict Liability in the Shadow of Juries, 67 SMU L. REV. 525, 525 
(2014). 
100 See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(b); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.610(b); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-202(B); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-203(b); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-503(2); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 251(b); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-204; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-3(b); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5202(b); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.040; MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 562.021(3); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103(1); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2(I); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c)(3); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-
02(2); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(C)(1); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.115(2); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 302(c); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-301(c); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102.
101 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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offense.102 In contrast, at least five states read in culpability 
requirements only when criminal offenses are completely silent about 
culpability. For example, Texas and Utah read in culpability 
requirements when an offense definition fails to prescribe “a culpable 
mental state.”103 Similarly, Arizona establishes a default of absolute 
liability—rather than recklessness—when an offense “does not 
expressly prescribe a culpable mental state that is sufficient for 
commission of the offense.”104 Kansas and Missouri go even further, 
explicitly providing that a stated culpability requirement “shall be 
required only as to specified element or elements, and a culpable 
mental state shall not be required as to any other element.”105 
Significantly, all five states have failed to adopt section 2.02(1).106  
Second, several states read in a culpability requirement when an 
offense or element “necessarily involves” a mental state. Colorado’s 
provision is typical, providing that “a culpable mental state may . . . 
be required for the commission of th[e] offense, or with respect to 
some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct 
necessarily involves such mental state.”107 Alabama, Arizona, 
102 Id. § 2.02(1). 
103 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b) (“If the definition of an offense does not prescribe 
a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state is nevertheless required unless the definition 
plainly dispenses with any mental element.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102 (“Every 
offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental state, and when the 
definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental state and the offense does not 
involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal 
responsibility.”). Arkansas’s default culpability provision has similar language. See ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 5-2-203(b) (reading in recklessness when an offense definition does not 
include a culpable mental state). But elsewhere, the Arkansas Criminal Code makes 
clear that culpability is ordinarily required for each offense element. See id. § 5-2-204(c) 
(requiring clear legislative intent for culpability to not be required for an element).  
104 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202(B) (“[Absolute liability applies when] a statute 
defining an offense does not expressly prescribe a culpable mental state that is sufficient for 
commission of the offense.”). 
105 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5202(g); MO. REV. STAT. § 562.021(2). 
106 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5202; MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 562.021; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102. Texas has a provision that is analogous to section
2.02(1), but it provides that an offense need only require some culpability, rather than
culpability for each offense element. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(a) (“Except as
provided in subsection (b), a person does not commit an offense unless he intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence engages in conduct as the definition of
the offense requires.”). Arkansas also lacks a provision like section 2.02(1). Additionally,
its default culpability provision seems to apply only when an offense fails to prescribe any
culpability at all. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-203(b). Elsewhere, however, the Arkansas
Criminal Code makes clear that culpability is ordinarily required for each offense element.
See id. § 5-2-204(c).
107 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-503(2) (2020). 
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Kentucky, New Jersey, and New York use nearly identical language.108 
The requirement seems to have originated in New York, which was the 
first of the six states to enact a new criminal code influenced by the 
MPC.109 New York’s provision was criticized as early as 1964 on the 
grounds that it was unclear when an offense or element necessarily 
involved a culpable mental state.110 More than half a century later, the 
requirement remains confusing.  
Complicating matters further, states have different approaches to 
incorporating the “necessarily involved” standard into their culpability 
schemes. In Arizona and Colorado, courts read in a mental state only if 
it is necessarily involved in an offense; hence, if a mental state is not 
necessarily involved, the offense imposes absolute liability.111 The 
remaining four states depart from the MPC by reading in a mental state 
that is necessarily involved in an offense, but they still ostensibly 
require culpability for each offense element.112 In such jurisdictions, it 
is unclear what purpose, if any, the “necessarily involved” standard 
should have. After all, if a code truly demands culpability for each 
offense element, there is no need to also require culpability for an 
element that necessarily involves a mental state. The requirement has 
108 See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(b) (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202(B); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 501.040 (West 2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c)(3) (West 2020); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 15.15(2) (McKinney 2019). Additionally, Ohio authorizes courts to read in a 
culpability requirement for “an element of an offense that is related to knowledge or intent 
or to which mens rea could fairly be applied.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(C)(1) 
(West 2020). No other state uses similar language, and the standard may be even more 
confusing than the “necessarily involved” standard. For example, it is unclear what it means 
for an offense element to be “related to knowledge or intent” even though neither culpability 
requirement is prescribed. Similarly, the Ohio provision is vague in permitting courts to read 
in culpability requirements that can “fairly be applied.”  
109 See Robinson & Dubber, supra note 17, at 326. The New York Penal Law became 
effective in 1967. Id. 
110 Note, The Proposed Penal Law of New York, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1483 (1964) 
(“[For many offenses] it is not clear whether a culpable mental state is necessarily involved, 
and, if so, whether the crime must be committed intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with 
criminal negligence.”). 
111 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202(B) (“If a statute defining an offense does not 
expressly prescribe a culpable mental state that is sufficient for commission of the offense, 
no culpable mental state is required for the commission of such offense, and the offense is 
one of strict liability unless the proscribed conduct necessarily involves a culpable mental 
state.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-503(1) (providing that a required mental state “is 
ordinarily designated” by a statute’s use of culpability terms). 
112 See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(b) (providing that an offense definition generally “states 
a crime of mental culpability”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.030(2) (generally requiring 
culpability for each element of the offense); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(a) (generally 
requiring culpability for each material element of the offense); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2) 
(providing that an offense definition generally states a crime of mental culpability). 
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meaning, however, if culpability is ordinarily not needed for all offense 
elements. 
Predictably, courts often fail to read in culpability requirements 
when default culpability provisions weaken the MPC’s norm of 
requiring culpability for each offense element. The Kansas Criminal 
Code, for instance, lacks a provision like section 2.02(1), and it fails to 
read in culpability requirements when an offense prescribes a culpable 
mental state for some elements but not others.113 In State v. White, the 
Kansas Court of Appeals interpreted a statute defining aggravated 
burglary as “without authority, entering into or remaining within any 
building . . . in which there is a human being with intent to commit a 
felony, theft or sexually motivated crime therein.”114 The defendant 
argued that the offense required culpability as to whether she lacked 
authority to enter the building at issue: a retail store she was banned 
from entering.115 The court rejected the defendant’s argument, holding 
that aggravated burglary did not require any culpability other than 
“intent to commit a felony, theft or sexually motivated crime.”116 
Addressing the state’s default culpability provision, the court observed 
that an offense need only require “some culpable mental state,” rather 
than culpability for “every element of an offense.”117 Hence, the jury 
did not need to be instructed on the defendant’s culpability as to her 
authority to enter the store,118 despite significant evidence she did not 
know she was banned from entering.119 
Additionally, courts in some states have imposed absolute liability 
because offenses did not necessarily involve culpable mental states. In 
State v. Gomez, the Arizona Court of Appeals refused to read a 
culpability requirement into the offense of aggravated driving under the 
113 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5202(g) (2020). 
114 State v. White, No. 112,939, 2016 WL 1169435, at *4, 367 P.3d 1284 (Kan. Ct. App. 
Mar. 25, 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
5807(b)). The court’s decision is unpublished, but it highlights a critical flaw of Kansas’s 
default culpability provision. Unfortunately for the defendant, the court applied the statute 
correctly.  
115 Id. at *1. 
116 Id. at *6. 
117 Id. at *5. 
118 Id. at *6. 
119 Id. at *2. The defendant was banned from the store after an earlier incident in which 
she was accused of stealing goods. Id. at *1. A store employee presented the defendant with 
a form explaining the ban’s terms. Id. The defendant then signed the form without reading 
it. Id. At trial, the defendant testified that she could not read the form but believed that it 
was just a warning because the effective date had been left blank. Id. at *2. The defendant 
also testified that she requested a copy of the form from the store but never received one. Id. 
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influence.120 The defendant had been convicted for driving while 
intoxicated with “a person under fifteen years of age . . . in the 
vehicle.”121 Affirming the defendant’s conviction, the appeals court 
held that the offense did not necessarily involve any culpability as to 
the passenger’s age.122 Perplexingly, the court used the defendant’s 
ignorance about the passenger’s age against him, stating that “there was 
no evidence to suggest he necessarily knew she was only 14” and “not 
everyone who transports a child ‘necessarily’ knows whether the child 
is younger than 15.”123 The court’s reasoning suggests that it is 
appropriate to read a culpability requirement into an offense only when 
it is impossible to commit a crime without that mental state. Such a 
restricted reading robs Arizona’s default culpability provision of any 
real meaning. 
Courts in other states interpret the “necessarily involved” standard 
differently but usually still in ways that condone absolute liability.124 
For example, Colorado inquires whether an offense “implies” a 
particular mental state.125 To determine whether a culpable mental 
state is necessarily involved in an offense, Colorado courts thus 
“examine the statute in context with other statutory provisions and seek 
to further the legislative intent represented by the statutory scheme.”126 
Applying that approach, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that a 
defendant must knowingly commit the act of contributing to the 
120 State v. Gomez, 437 P.3d 896, 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019).  
121 Id. at 897 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1383(A)(3) (2020)). 
122 Id. at 898. 
123 Id.  
124 New Jersey appears to be an outlier among states that have adopted the “necessarily 
involved” standard. New Jersey’s default culpability provision requires reading in “a 
culpable mental state” for an element when “the proscribed conduct necessarily involves 
such culpable mental state.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c)(3) (West 2020). But the very next 
sentence then states that, in the absence of clear legislative intent to impose absolute liability, 
an offense should be interpreted to require knowledge. Id. Similarly, New Jersey generally 
requires culpability “with respect to each material element of the offense.” Id. § 2C:2-2(a). 
As discussed earlier, it is unclear what purpose the “necessarily involved” standard should 
have if culpability is generally required for each offense element. See supra text 
accompanying note 93. New Jersey courts have resolved the statute’s ambiguity by diluting 
the requirement that an offense necessarily involve knowledge. E.g., State v. Sewell, 603 
A.2d 21 (N.J. 1992). For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that knowledge
is generally required for each element and “[t]hat culpable mental state is the specific
culpable mental state ‘necessarily involved’ in the ‘proscribed conduct.’” Id. at 23.
125 People v. Manzo, 144 P.3d 551, 556 (Colo. 2006); Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 
665 (Colo. 2000). 
126 Manzo, 144 P.3d at 556. 
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delinquency of a minor,127 but no culpability is required for the 
victim’s age because “[t]he statute’s purpose is the protection of 
minors.”128 In contrast, the MPC does not consider an offense’s 
purpose at all in determining its culpability requirements, much less a 
purpose so broad. 
Finally, in at least two states, courts have given meaning to the 
“necessarily involved” standard by devaluing their codes’ general 
requirements of culpability for each offense element.129 In Saxton v. 
Commonwealth, for example, the Kentucky Supreme Court examined 
a statute that criminalized selling a controlled substance within 1,000 
yards of a school.130 Such statutes are common, and this Article 
discusses several cases interpreting similar offenses because they often 
raise issues about what culpability, if any, is required as to proximity. 
Significantly, the Kentucky Penal Code ordinarily requires acting 
culpably “with respect to each element of the offense.”131 In Saxton, 
the court declined to apply that requirement, in part because 
Kentucky’s default culpability provision applies where “the proscribed 
conduct necessarily involves such culpable mental state.”132 Reading 
the provision’s language extremely narrowly, the court reasoned that 
proximity to a school was not conduct, but rather “a circumstance that 
can lead to harsher punishment.”133 Similarly, the New York Penal 
Code generally requires culpability “with respect to every material 
127 Gorman, 19 P.3d at 665 (citing People v. Trevino, 826 P.2d 399, 402 (Colo. 1992)). 
128 Id. at 667. Similarly, in People v. Manzo, the Colorado Supreme Court imposed 
absolute liability for an aggravated form of leaving the scene of an accident. 144 P.3d at 
557. The court reasoned that imposing absolute liability better advanced the legislative
purpose of promoting safe driving. Id. at 556–57. In general, then, Colorado courts have
used the “necessarily involved” standard to weaken the state’s default culpability provision.
129 It should be noted that Alabama law is unclear in this area. Alabama’s default 
culpability provision authorizes courts to read in “an appropriate culpable mental state” for 
an element when “the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such culpable mental state.” 
ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(b) (2020). But the provision also states that an offense generally 
defines “a crime of mental culpability,” id., meaning that culpability is required for each 
element, id. § 13A-2-3. Alabama courts have not directly addressed the meaning of the 
phrase “necessarily involved,” leaving the phrase unclear.  
130 Saxton v. Commonwealth, 315 S.W.3d 293 (Ky. 2010). The statute has since been 
amended to aggravate the offense for drug sales within 1,000 feet of a school. See KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 218A.1411(1) (West 2020). 
131 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.030(2).  
132 Saxton, 315 S.W.3d at 299 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.040). 
133 Id. 
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element of an offense.”134 Yet, at least on the trial court level, that 
requirement sometimes yields to New York’s demand that an unstated 
culpability requirement must be necessarily involved in the offense.135 
Hence, like Kentucky, New York sometimes imposes absolute liability 
where the MPC would not.  
In sum, a significant number of MPC jurisdictions fail to require 
culpability for each offense element. In permitting absolute liability, 
such states have significantly weakened both the MPC’s read-in 
provision and its culpability scheme.  
C. States Read in Culpability Levels Other than Recklessness
When MPC states do read an unstated culpability requirement into a 
criminal offense, half of them authorize culpability levels other than 
recklessness.136 Six states specify a different default culpability level 
in their criminal codes. On one end of the spectrum, Kentucky, 
Montana, New York, and Oregon permit courts to read in a requirement 
of negligence,137 meaning that an actor may be held liable for merely 
failing to be aware of a risk that an offense element existed.138 
Approaching the other extreme, Missouri and New Jersey elevate the 
134 New York generally requires construing an offense “as defining a crime of mental 
culpability.” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2) (McKinney 2019). An offense defines a crime of 
“mental culpability” if it requires culpability for each material element. Id. § 15.10. 
135 For example, in People v. Patterson, 708 N.Y.S.2d 815, 821 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2000), 
the defendant moved to dismiss because the criminal complaint did not allege that he acted 
knowingly or intentionally in failing to register as a sex offender. The court held that the 
offense imposed strict liability. Id. at 825. It reasoned, in part, that the offense did not 
necessarily involve culpability because it was “easy to imagine any number of circumstances 
where a defendant might fail to register as a Sex Offender without consciously intending to 
violate the law.” Id. at 822. The court’s reasoning thus suggests that an offense necessarily 
involves a mental state only if the defendant’s conduct is highly corroborative of the required 
culpability. See id. That interpretation severely limits the read-in provision in a way that 
makes it all but useless for defendants who commit crimes unwittingly. 
136 Only eleven states follow the MPC in establishing recklessness as the default 
culpability level. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.610(b) (2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-203(b) 
(2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 251(b) (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-204 (2020); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-5202(b) (2020); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(2) (2019) (using 
“willfully” in place of “recklessly”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(C)(1) (West 2020); 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 302(c) (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-301(c) (2020); TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b) (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102 (West 2020). 
137 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.010(1)–.040 (requiring negligence but calling it 
“recklessness”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103(1) (2019); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 161.115(2) (2020). 
138 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.020(4) (defining “recklessly” to mean negligence); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103(1) (defining “negligently” to include both recklessness and 
negligence); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.115(2). 
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required culpability all the way to knowledge.139 Therefore, in both 
states, an actor must be aware of the nature of his or her conduct, know 
of the attendant circumstances, and be practically certain of the 
offense’s results.140 For example, the Missouri Supreme Court has 
required knowledge for the offense of distributing a controlled 
substance near government-assisted housing, meaning that a defendant 
must know he or she is within 1,000 feet of public housing to commit 
the offense.141 In contrast, the MPC’s recklessness requirement would 
impose liability for anyone who culpably disregards a risk that public 
housing is nearby. 
Even more problematically, courts in at least five states can choose 
the required mental state when an offense does not prescribe one. In 
New Hampshire and Illinois, courts choose the required culpability 
because of problems peculiar to their criminal codes. New Hampshire’s 
criminal code lacks a true read-in provision,142 and Illinois’s default 
culpability provision merely requires courts to read in any of the three 
culpability levels starting at recklessness.143 In three other states, courts 
choose their own culpability requirements because their codes read in 
only mental states that are necessarily involved in offenses. Colorado 
authorizes courts to read in “a culpable mental state” if an offense 
“necessarily involves such a culpable mental state.”144 Likewise, 
Arizona provides that an offense without express culpability 
requirements “is [ordinarily] one of strict liability unless the proscribed 
139 MO. REV. STAT. § 562.021(3) (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c)(3) (West 2020). 
140 MO. REV. STAT. § 562.016(3); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(b)(1). 
141 State v. Minner, 256 S.W.3d 92, 95 (Mo. 2008). Since the Missouri Supreme Court’s 
decision, the statute has been moved and revised. See MO. REV. STAT. § 579.030. 
142 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2 (2020). Nevertheless, New Hampshire does 
require a defendant to act “purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may 
require, with respect to each material element of the offense.” Id. § 626:2(I). 
143 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-3(b) (2012). The Illinois Criminal Code also lacks a 
provision like section 2.02(5) of the MPC. Section 2.02(5) establishes a hierarchy among 
the Code’s four culpable mental states, such that proof of a more culpable mental state will 
satisfy an offense’s requirement of a less serious one. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(5) 
(AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). In the absence of such a provision, Illinois 
courts perceive knowledge and recklessness as being mutually exclusive, rather than 
hierarchical. See, e.g., People v. Fornear, 680 N.E.2d 1383, 1387 (Ill. 1997) (reversing, as 
legally inconsistent, convictions for multiple offenses where one required knowledge and 
another required recklessness); People v. Washington, 141 N.E.3d 777, 784 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2019) (“When the jury returns multiple guilty verdicts on knowing and reckless offenses for 
the same conduct, the verdicts are legally inconsistent, and the defendant is entitled to a new 
trial.”). Such confusion may also lead Illinois courts to choose their own culpability 
requirements.  
144 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-503(2) (2020). 
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conduct necessarily involves a culpable mental state.”145 Finally, 
Alabama’s default culpability provision vaguely directs courts to 
require “an appropriate culpable mental state.”146  
When permitted to choose the required culpability, courts select a 
variety of mental states using a variety of rationales. In Alabama, courts 
typically read in the lowest culpability level permitted by the offense, 
typically negligence.147 At least one court, however, has suggested that 
the appropriate mental state might depend “on the facts of each 
case.”148 In contrast, the Arizona Court of Appeals recently relied on 
the common law in holding that the offense of organized retail theft 
requires intent to deprive.149 The court concluded that the offense 
necessarily involves an intent to deprive because larceny required it at 
common law.150 And in Colorado, courts have sometimes relied on 
questionable indicia of legislative intent to determine whether an 
offense necessarily involves a mental state. In People v. Hickman, for 
instance, the Colorado Supreme Court read a culpability requirement 
of specific intent into a witness-retaliation statute even though the 
legislature had recently deleted the word “intentionally” from the 
offense definition.151 The court ultimately relied on more attenuated 
evidence of legislative intent, such as the offense’s location in the 
Colorado statutes, vague testimony from a committee hearing about the 
145 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202(B) (2020). 
146 ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(b) (2020). Kentucky, New Jersey, and New York also read in 
mental states that are necessarily involved in offenses, and Ohio has a similar standard. See 
supra note 108 and accompanying text. This discussion does not address these four states 
because their default culpability provisions prescribe specific mental states. See KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 501.010(1)–.040 (West 2020) (requiring negligence but calling it 
“recklessness”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c)(3) (West 2020) (requiring knowledge); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 15.15(2) (McKinney 2019) (requiring negligence); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2901.21(C)(1) (West 2020) (requiring recklessness).
147 See, e.g., State v. Turner, 96 So. 3d 876, 882 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (“Section 36-
25-5(a) does not exclude any of those mental states; thus, the offense of using an official
position or office for personal gain may be committed intentionally, knowingly, recklessly,
or as the result of criminal negligence.”); Sullens v. State, 878 So. 2d 1216, 1222 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2003) (“[W]e interpret the fact that the statute does not specifically exclude any states
of mental culpability to be an indication of the Legislature’s intent to include any of the
states of mental culpability . . . .”).
148 Scott v. State, 917 So. 2d 159, 173 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (discussing offense of 
displaying genitals for entertainment purposes). 
149 State v. Veloz, 342 P.3d 1272, 1276 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015). 
150 Id. 
151 People v. Hickman, 988 P.2d 628, 644 (Colo. 1999) (“Even though the legislature 
deleted the word ‘intentionally’ from the statute, the statute nonetheless requires intentional 
conduct.”). 
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amendment, and the offense’s use of the terms “retribution” and 
“retaliation.”152  
New Hampshire and Illinois courts also use various reasoning to 
impose culpability requirements that differ from one offense to another. 
New Hampshire reads in a culpability level that is “appropriate in light 
of the nature of the offense and the policy considerations for punishing 
the conduct in question.”153 That standard typically requires the court 
to consider an offense’s culpability requirements at common law.154 If 
an offense did not exist at common law, New Hampshire courts attempt 
to ascertain legislative intent based on legislative history.155 Illinois 
courts sometimes also purport to effectuate legislative intent when 
choosing mental states.156 In other instances, Illinois courts emphasize 
the legislature’s silence about culpability and then proceed to select 
their own mental states, sometimes without explanation.157 Illinois 
courts have read in both recklessness and knowledge,158 and New 
Hampshire courts have required negligence, knowledge, and 
purpose159—that is, everything but recklessness. 
152 Id. at 644–46. 
153 State v. Mandatory Poster Agency, Inc., 126 A.3d 844, 847 (N.H. 2015) (quoting 
State v. Rollins-Ercolino, 821 A.2d 953, 956 (N.H. 2003)) (quotation omitted in original). 
154 See, e.g., Mandatory Poster, 126 A.3d at 847; State v. Bergen, 677 A.2d 145, 146 
(N.H. 1996); State v. Ayer, 612 A.2d 923, 925 (N.H. 1992). 
155 Mandatory Poster, 126 A.3d at 847; Rollins-Ercolino, 821 A.2d at 956. 
156 See, e.g., People v. Sevilla, 547 N.E.2d 117, 121 (Ill. 1989) (“In determining which 
mental state element is implied under the Act, we find it instructive to examine the language 
of the statute, as well as the language of any parallel statute.”). 
157 See, e.g., People v. Gean, 573 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Ill. 1991) (“According to the Illinois 
Criminal Code, when a statute neither prescribes a particular mental state nor creates an 
absolute liability offense, then either intent, knowledge or recklessness applies. In the case 
at bar, we believe knowledge is the appropriate mental element.”) (citation omitted); People 
v. Terrell, 547 N.E.2d 145, 158 (Ill. 1989) (“[T]he legislature clearly did not intend the
aggravated criminal sexual assault statute to define a strict liability or public welfare offense.
Accordingly, a mental state of either intent or knowledge implicitly is required for sexual
penetration to occur.”) (citation omitted).
158 See, e.g., People v. Witherspoon, 129 N.E.3d 1208, 1215 (Ill. 2019) (requiring 
knowledge for home invasion); People v. Anderson, 591 N.E.2d 461, 465 (Ill. 1992) 
(requiring recklessness for hazing); Gean, 573 N.E.2d at 822 (requiring knowledge for 
“chop shop” offenses); Terrell, 547 N.E.2d at 158 (requiring knowledge for aggravated 
criminal sexual assault); Sevilla, 547 N.E.2d at 122 (requiring knowledge for failing to file 
a tax return); People v. Stanley, 921 N.E.2d 445, 453 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (requiring 
knowledge for possession of a defaced firearm but imposing absolute liability as to the 
weapon’s character). 
159 See, e.g., Mandatory Poster, 126 A.3d at 849 (requiring purpose for criminal 
violations of the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act); Rollins-Ercolino, 821 A.2d 
at 958 (requiring negligence for vehicular assault); Bergen, 677 A.2d at 147 (requiring 
knowledge for indecent exposure and lewdness); Ayer, 612 A.2d at 925 (requiring 
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When a criminal code fails to explain how to interpret offenses’ 
culpability requirements, courts are forced to devise principles of their 
own. The resulting law often varies from one offense to another, and 
thus there is little rhyme or reason to offenses’ basic requirements. In 
some cases, such inconsistency can affect prosecutors—and even the 
public—as it becomes difficult to ascertain what is and is not lawful. 
To provide guidance to courts and promote uniformity between 
offenses, criminal codes must establish true default culpability 
requirements. Moreover, as discussed earlier in Section I.B., 
recklessness is the best default culpability level because it punishes 
sufficiently blameworthy conduct without requiring prosecutors to 
prove too much. In departing from that standard, many states have 
undermined the MPC’s culpability scheme. 
D. States Permit Absolute Liability Based on Legislative Intent
In contrast to the MPC,160 adopting states have been extremely
tolerant of absolute liability, even permitting it for serious offenses in 
their criminal codes.161 Most state criminal codes therefore deviate 
from the MPC by providing exceptions to their default culpability 
provisions. The most common exception is for statutes showing 
legislative intent to impose absolute liability. A dozen states recognize 
legislative-intent exceptions—even for offenses in their criminal 
codes.162 An additional six states permit absolute liability based on 
legislative intent for offenses outside their codes.163 Unlike the MPC, 
those states generally treat such non-Code offenses as crimes. 
In nearly every state with a legislative-intent exception, absolute 
liability is permitted when a statute “clearly” or “plainly” indicates 
knowledge for aggravated sexual assault); State v. Aldrich, 466 A.2d 938, 941 (N.H. 1983) 
(requiring knowledge for escape). 
160 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 
1962). 
161 See supra note 76. 
162 ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(b) (2020); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.600(b)(2) (2019); 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/4-9 (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5203(a), (b) (2020); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 562.026(2) (2020); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-104 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-
2(c)(3) (West 2020); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2) (McKinney 2019); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2901.21(B) (West 2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-301(b) (2020); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 6.02(b) (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102 (West 2020).
Additionally, Colorado courts consider legislative intent to determine whether an offense
necessarily involves a mental state. See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text.
163 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-204(c)(2) (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 251(c)(2) 
(2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-212(2) (2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.050(2) (West 
2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.105(1)(b) (2020); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 305(a)(2) (2020). 
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legislative intent to impose strict liability.164 That standard is 
substantially similar to section 2.05 of the MPC, which allows absolute 
liability for non-Code offenses when “a legislative purpose to impose 
absolute liability . . . plainly appears.”165 Significantly, the MPC’s 
drafters declined to clarify when a legislative purpose plainly 
appears.166 Instead, the drafters explicitly left that determination “to 
the judgment of the courts.”167 Similarly, in permitting absolute 
liability when legislatures clearly or plainly intend to impose absolute 
liability, MPC states have largely deferred to courts’ judgments about 
offenses’ culpability requirements. 
All courts have their own standards for ascertaining legislative 
intent, which is a notoriously slippery concept.168 The problem is that 
there is rarely conclusive evidence of what a legislature intended. 
Indeed, courts can find legislative intent based on various indicia, 
including a statute’s language, its structure, its apparent or stated 
purpose, and its legislative history.169 Given the number of possible 
authorities and arguments, a court can easily find evidence to support 
nearly any interpretation of a legislature’s intent for a given statute.170 
164 ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(b) (“clearly indicating”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-204(c)(2) 
(“clearly indicates”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 251(c)(2) (“plainly appears”); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 702-212(2) (“plainly appears”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-9 (“clearly indicates”); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5203(a), (b) (“clearly indicates”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 501.050(2) (“clearly indicates”); MO. REV. STAT. § 562.026(2) (“clearly inconsistent” or
“may lead to an absurd or unjust result”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-104 (“clearly
indicates”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c)(3) (“clearly indicates”); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 15.15(2) (“clearly indicates”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B) (“plainly indicates”);
OR. REV. STAT. § 161.115 (“clearly indicates”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 305(a)(2) (“plainly
appears”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b) (“plainly dispenses”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
2-102 (“clearly indicates”). Alaska uses an even more relaxed standard, permitting absolute
liability whenever legislative intent “is present.” ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.600(b)(2).
165 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05(1)(b) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
166 MPC COMMENTARIES, PART I, supra note 20, § 2.05 cmt. 3, at 294. 
167 Id. The commentary concludes that “the . . . requirement that such a purpose ‘plainly 
appears’ goes as far as it is wise to go.” Id. The drafters suggested that requirement might 
be satisfied by “either a settled interpretation or an explicit statement in the statute.” Id.  
168 Many question whether legislative intent even exists. For example, Judge Frank 
Easterbrook has argued that legislatures, as bodies, cannot possibly have collective intents. 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) (“Because 
legislatures comprise many members, they do not have ‘intents’ or ‘designs,’ hidden yet 
discoverable. Each member may or may not have a design. The body as a whole, however, 
has only outcomes.”).  
169 See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:5 (7th ed. 2008). 
170 Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretation Methodologies, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971, 1975 (2007). As discussed earlier, Colorado courts have used 
questionable evidence of legislative intent in choosing the appropriate culpable level for 
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As a result, legislative-intent exceptions threaten to undermine the 
Code’s norm of requiring culpability for each offense element, 
especially in the many jurisdictions that are willing to impose absolute 
liability for serious criminal offenses.171  
Unsurprisingly, courts in MPC states have developed several 
different standards for determining whether statutes indicate legislative 
intent to impose absolute liability. In a few states, courts have 
emphasized, correctly, that such legislative intent must be clear or 
plain. For example, the Missouri Supreme Court requires that 
legislative intent to dispense with a culpability requirement be “clearly 
apparent.”172 The Hawai‘i Supreme Court imposes an even stricter 
standard, requiring legislative intent to be evinced through either 
“express” statutory language or “unequivocal” legislative history.173 
Similarly, Utah permits absolute liability only when an offense 
“specifically states” that culpability is not required.174 The Utah 
Supreme Court has also observed that the state’s default culpability 
provision “is not merely a canon of interpretation or a non-binding 
suggestion,” and the provision does not permit mere “educated 
guesswork based upon inferences drawn from the language of a 
criminal offense.”175 That admonition is in keeping with the MPC’s 
commentary, which states that a legislative purpose to impose absolute 
liability “should not be discerned lightly.”176 
offenses that “necessarily involve” mental states. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying 
text. 
171 Out of the twenty-five states with culpability provisions significantly influenced by 
the MPC, seventeen authorize absolute liability for criminal offenses in their criminal codes. 
See sources cited supra note 76. 
172 State v. Self, 155 S.W.3d 756, 762 (Mo. 2005) (en banc). In Self, the court interpreted 
a statute mandating school attendance to require a parent’s culpability in causing her child 
to miss school. Id. at 758. The court concluded that there was no evidence that the legislature 
intended to impose absolute liability. Id. at 762. Rather, the court reasoned, “the necessity 
of proof of some level of scienter is implicit in the requirement that the parent ‘cause’ their 
child to regularly attend school.” Id. Hence, the prosecution was required to prove that the 
defendant knowingly or purposely caused her child to regularly fail to attend school. Id. 
173 State v. Gonzalez, 288 P.3d 788, 795 (Haw. 2012). In Gonzalez, the Hawai‘i Supreme 
Court held that recklessness was required for the offense of driving at an excessive speed. 
Id. at 798. The court reasoned that “[t]he legislative history demonstrate[d] only an intent to 
punish severely those who are ultimately found guilty, not to increase the class of guilty 
persons to those lacking any culpable mental state.” Id.  
174 State v. Jimenez, 284 P.3d 640, 643 (Utah 2012) (quoting State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 
727, 728 (Utah 1984)). In Jimenez, the Utah Supreme Court required recklessness as to 
whether an accomplice possessed a dangerous weapon. Id. at 644. It reasoned that there was 
no evidence the legislature intended to impose absolute liability. Id. at 643–44. 
175 State v. Loeffel, 300 P.3d 336, 338–39 (Utah Ct. App. 2013). 
176 MPC COMMENTARIES, PART I, supra note 20, § 2.05 cmt. 3, at 293. 
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Most courts, however, have softened their states’ requirements of 
clear legislative intent. The Oregon Supreme Court, noting the absence 
of legislative guidance about the requirement, has developed its own 
four-factor test.177 The factors include the statute’s text, including the 
structure of the statutory scheme;178 “the nature of the element at 
issue”;179 the statute’s legislative history;180 and its purpose.181 In 
some other jurisdictions, courts have relied on nonbinding authority 
concerning whether a crime is in the nature of a “regulatory” or “public 
welfare” offense. For example, relying on a popular criminal law 
treatise, Texas has adopted six factors, including “[t]he legislative 
history of the statute or its title or context”; “[t]he severity of the 
punishment”; “[t]he seriousness of harm to the public which may be 
expected to follow from the forbidden conduct”; “[t]he defendant’s 
opportunity to ascertain the true facts”; “[t]he difficulty prosecuting 
officials would have in proving a mental state”; and “[t]he number of 
prosecutions to be expected.”182 The Alabama Supreme Court has 
endorsed similar considerations, relying on such nonbinding authorities 
as criminal law treatises and United States Supreme Court 
interpretations of the federal criminal code.183 
In considering such a broad range of factors, courts seem to be 
determining whether the weight of evidence shows legislative intent to 
impose absolute liability, rather than whether such intent is clear or 
plain. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how legislative intent could ever 
be clear if ascertaining the legislature’s rationale requires balancing 
several factors that are themselves somewhat subjective. Moreover, 
courts violate the MPC’s principles of statutory construction when they 
gloss over the requirement that legislative intent must be plain. 
Importantly, the Code requires construing provisions “according to the 
177 State v. Rainoldi, 268 P.3d 568, 571 (Or. 2011) (en banc). 
178 Id. at 571–72. 
179 Id. at 572. Oregon courts are more likely to require culpability for conduct elements 
than for circumstance elements or elements that “pertain to the conduct of the defendant.” 
Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 573. 
182 Aguirre v. State, 22 S.W.3d 463, 475–76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc) (quoting 
1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 342–44 (2d 
ed. 1986)); see also State v. Abdallah, 64 S.W.3d 175, 177–78 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001). 
183 Smith v. City of Tuscaloosa, 666 So. 2d 101, 104–06 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995). In 
Smith, the court characterized two driving offenses, driving with a revoked license and 
driving with improper lights, as “public welfare offenses.” Id. at 104. The court thus held 
that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that both crimes were strict-liability 
offenses. See id. at 106. 
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fair import of their terms.”184 Applying that principle, absolute liability 
should never be based on evidence of legislative intent that is 
ambiguous. 
Nevertheless, several courts have weakened their states’ default 
culpability provisions by relying on questionable evidence of 
legislative intent.185 One tactic is for a court to broadly characterize an 
offense’s purpose and then assert its own policy reasons for imposing 
absolute liability. For example, in State v. Rutley, the Oregon Supreme 
Court interpreted a statute that criminalizes selling drugs within 1,000 
feet of a school.186 The offense is graded as a Class A felony,187 
making it one of Oregon’s most serious criminal offenses.188 The 
offense definition prescribes no mental state for the proximity 
element,189 and Oregon’s default culpability provision ordinarily 
requires reading in a requirement of negligence.190 Hence, to commit 
the offense, the defendant would need to be at least negligent as to the 
proximity of a school. Nevertheless, the court held that the jury did not 
need to be instructed about the defendant’s mental state because the 
legislature intended to dispense with all culpability requirements.191 
The court reasoned that the offense is a Class A felony, showing 
that “the legislature intended to protect children from drug use and 
the violence and other negative influences that accompany drug 
delivery.”192 Requiring knowledge, the court continued, would 
184 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(3) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). Most 
of the states surveyed in this Article have adopted similar standards for interpreting 
provisions in their criminal codes. See ALA. CODE § 13A-1-6 (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-104 (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 203 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-104 
(2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500.030 (West 2020); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-1-102(2) 
(2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:3 (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-2(c) (West 2020); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 5.00 (McKinney 2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.025(2) (2020); 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 105 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-104 (2020); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 1.05(a) (West 2019). In the remaining states, it is likely even clearer that courts violate
principles of statutory construction by disregarding requirements of “clear” or “plain”
legislative intent to impose absolute liability. After all, criminal statutes are traditionally
required to be construed strictly in favor of defendants. See 3 SHAMBIE SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59:3 (8th ed. 2020).
185 E.g., People v. Harris, 74 N.E.3d 1, 10–12 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017); People v. Mitchell, 
571 N.E.2d 701, 704 (N.Y. 1991); State v. Rutley, 171 P.3d 361, 364 (Or. 2007). 
186 Rutley, 171 P.3d at 365. 
187 OR. REV. STAT. § 475.904(2). 
188 See id. § 161.605(1) (authorizing imprisonment for up to twenty years for Class A 
felonies). 
189 See id. § 475.904(1). 
190 Id. § 161.115(2). 
191 Rutley, 171 P.3d at 365. 
192 Id. 
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undermine “the obvious legislative purpose, in that it would create an 
incentive for drug dealers not to identify schools, and not to take into 
consideration their distance from them in engaging in their illegal 
activity.”193 Inexplicably, the court failed to address even the 
possibility of requiring negligence, even though that is Oregon’s 
default culpability level.194 
The New York Court of Appeals has also justified absolute liability 
by broadly characterizing an offense’s purpose. In People v. Mitchell, 
the court examined New York’s offense for fourth-degree possession 
of stolen property.195 The statute defines the offense to occur, in 
relevant part, when the actor “knowingly possesses stolen property” 
and when “[t]he property consists of a credit card.”196 The court held 
that the defendant could be convicted of the offense without having any 
culpability as to whether the wallet he stole contained a credit card.197 
The court reasoned that the offense was enacted “to combat growing 
credit card theft and abuse,” and requiring knowledge “would sap the 
statute of its intended purpose.”198 The court focused exclusively on 
knowledge even though New York, like Oregon, ordinarily requires 
reading in a requirement of negligence.199  
Courts sometimes also infer legislative intent to impose absolute 
liability merely because related offenses are explicit in requiring 
culpability. For example, the Illinois Criminal Code criminalizes both 
vehicular hijacking and aggravated vehicular hijacking. The base 
offense requires “knowingly tak[ing] a motor vehicle from the person 
or the immediate presence of another by the use of force or by 
threatening the imminent use of force.”200 The aggravated form of the 
offense can occur, among other circumstances, when the victim “is a 
person with a physical disability.”201 In People v. Harris, the defendant 
was convicted of aggravated vehicular hijacking for stealing a car from 
a victim who was deaf.202 On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court held 
that no culpability was required as to the victim’s disability.203 The 
193 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
194 OR. REV. STAT. § 161.115(2). 
195 People v. Mitchell, 571 N.E.2d 701, 702 (N.Y. 1991). 
196 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.45 (McKinney 2019). 
197 Mitchell, 571 N.E.2d at 704. 
198 Id. 
199 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2). 
200 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-3(a) (2012). 
201 Id. 5/18-4(a)(1). 
202 People v. Harris, 74 N.E.3d 1, 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). 
203 Id. at 12. 
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court reasoned that, unlike ordinary vehicular hijacking, the aggravated 
offense “does not use the term ‘knowingly’ or any mental state 
language whatsoever.”204 If the legislature had intended to require 
culpability, the court continued, it could have easily prescribed a 
culpability requirement.205 In so reasoning, the court seemed to require 
that the legislature plainly indicate its intent to require culpability, 
rather than its intent to impose absolute liability.206 Importantly, 
Illinois grades aggravated vehicular hijacking of a disabled victim as a 
Class X felony,207 making it one of the most serious criminal offenses 
in the Illinois Criminal Code.208 
If anything, serious criminal offenses should be construed to require 
culpability. Several MPC states, however, have permitted absolute 
liability by largely deferring to courts’ judgments about offenses’ 
culpability requirements. In doing so, they have strayed far from the 
MPC’s norm of requiring at least recklessness for each offense element. 
E. States Fail to Require Culpability for Grading Provisions
In several MPC jurisdictions, courts refuse to apply default 
culpability provisions to grading provisions, thus imposing absolute 
liability for serious crimes. The problem occurs because adopting states 
have not only failed to correct the MPC’s deficiencies but have also 
exacerbated them. As discussed earlier, the MPC does not make it 
sufficiently clear that section 2.02(3) applies to offense elements that 
appear in grading provisions.209 Section 2.02(3) reads in recklessness 
for a “material element of an offense.”210 The Code defines “element,” 
in turn, to mean conduct, circumstances, or results that are “included 
. . . in the definition of the offense.”211 Yet, as shown by their 
204 Id. at 10 (emphasis omitted). 
205 Id. at 12. 
206 See id. Significantly, the Illinois Criminal Code generally requires culpability for 
each element of a criminal offense unless the statute “clearly indicates a legislative purpose 
to impose absolute liability.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-9. Because there must be clear intent 
to dispense with culpability requirements, courts should never interpret mere silence about 
culpability as evincing intent to impose absolute liability. At least one other court has gotten 
the exception backwards by requiring that there be clear intent to require culpability, rather 
than clear intent to dispense with culpability requirements. See State v. Bryant, 15 A.3d 865, 
871 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (stating that mental state of knowledge was not 
required absent express legislative intent). 
207 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-4(b). 
208 See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-10(a). 
209 See supra Section I.C.2. 
210 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
211 Id. § 1.13(9). 
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commentary, the drafters intended for the Code’s culpability rules to 
apply to all offense elements, regardless of where they appear.  
A strong majority of MPC jurisdictions deviate from section 2.02(3) 
by directly limiting their default culpability provisions to offense 
definitions. In fact, seventeen states read in culpability requirements 
only for an offense definition or a statute defining an offense;212 
additionally, North Dakota provides that culpability generally is “not 
required with respect to any fact which is solely a basis for grading.”213 
The distinction between offense definitions and grading provisions 
can be somewhat fortuitous. For example, consider the offenses of 
assault and aggravated assault.214 Both require causing bodily harm to 
another person,215 and aggravated assault may occur when a defendant 
uses a weapon, causes great bodily harm, or injures a particular kind of 
victim. A criminal code could reasonably use various approaches to 
define and grade assault and aggravated assault. One approach would 
be to treat assault and aggravated assault as distinct offenses, giving 
them separate code sections with their own offense definitions and 
grading provisions. Alternatively, a criminal code could have just a 
single offense called assault. Under that approach, the offense 
definition might require only causing bodily harm to another person, 
and a grading provision might aggravate the offense when a defendant 
212 See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(b) (2020); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.610(b) (2019); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202(B) (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-503(2) (2020); 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/4-3(b); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5202(b) (2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 501.040 (West 2020); MO. REV. STAT. § 562.021(3) (2020); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-
103(1) (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c)(3) (West 2020); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2)
(McKinney 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(2) (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2901.21(C)(1) (West 2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.115(2) (2020); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-11-301(c) (2020); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b) (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-2-102 (West 2020).
213 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(3)(c). Similarly, the Maine Criminal Code states that
culpability is generally not required for “[a]ny fact that is solely a basis for sentencing 
classification.” ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 34(4)(a) (2019). The provision seems unnecessary, 
however, because Maine lacks a default culpability provision. Id. § 34(1) (requiring 
culpability only if the statute specifies a culpable mental state). 
214 My examples use the modern terminology by calling the offenses “assault” and 
“aggravated assault.” Most states now define assault to include the common-law crime of 
battery. See LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 16.1 n.3 (citing twenty-eight states that define assault 
as what was battery under the common law). 
215 Francis X. Shen, Mind, Body, and the Criminal Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 2036, 2045–
46 (2013) (“Bodily injury is a part of many aspects of the criminal and quasi-criminal code, 
including simple assault; aggravated assault; unlawful arrest; aggravated robbery; menacing; 
civil commitment; and the burden of proof for release from civil commitment after finding 
of not guilty by reason of insanity.”). 
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uses a weapon, causes great bodily harm, or injures a particular kind of 
victim. 
It would be most logical to treat the culpability requirements the 
same for both approaches to defining assault and aggravated assault. 
Hence, if either an offense definition or a grading provision aggravates 
the offense based on a circumstance or result, the actor would need to 
be culpable as to that element. But most jurisdictions risk a different 
result by limiting their default culpability provisions to offense 
definitions. In such jurisdictions, aggravated assault may require 
culpability for all elements if it has its own offense definition, but it 
may not if the same elements appear in a grading provision. That 
outcome is plainly arbitrary. 
Nevertheless, courts in several MPC jurisdictions have imposed 
absolute liability for offense elements that appear in grading 
provisions. For example, Illinois courts have seized on narrow 
language in the state’s default culpability provision, which requires 
culpability only for “each element described by the statute defining the 
offense.”216 Reading the provision strictly, Illinois courts have 
repeatedly held that defendants may be held liable for delivering 
controlled substances near protected places without having any 
culpability as to their proximity.217 In People v. Brooks, for example, 
the Illinois Appellate Court interpreted a statute that used separate 
subsections to define a felony for knowingly selling cocaine and then 
aggravate the offense if it occurred within 1,000 feet of a housing 
authority site.218 The court held that Illinois’s default culpability 
provision did not apply to the aggravated offense because it requires a 
mental state only for elements in “the statute defining an offense.”219 
Thus, the court concluded, the provision had “no relevance” to what it 
characterized as an “enhancing statute.”220 The Illinois Appellate Court 
216 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-3(a). 
217 People v. Daniels, 718 N.E.2d 1064, 1072 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); People v. Pacheco, 
666 N.E.2d 370, 376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); People v. Brooks, 648 N.E.2d 626, 627 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1995). 
218 Brooks, 648 N.E.2d at 627. 
219 Id. at 629 (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-3(a)). 
220 Id. 
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has applied similar reasoning in holding that no culpability is required 
for a defendant’s proximity to a school221 or house of worship.222  
Texas courts have also justified imposing absolute liability by 
distinguishing grading provisions from offense definitions. In White v. 
State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals examined a statute that, like 
the one in Brooks, used one provision to define a base offense for 
delivering a controlled substance and another provision to aggravate 
for selling drugs near a protected place.223 The court held that no 
culpability was required as to the defendant’s proximity to a youth 
center,224 reasoning in part that the legislature had “not created a 
separate offense”225 and that the default culpability provision applies 
to “an offense” but not “an enhancement statute.”226 The court found 
it important that proximity did not “render otherwise innocuous 
conduct wrongful” and thus failed to “separate lawful from unlawful 
conduct.”227 In Rodriguez v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals followed White, holding that aggravated assault did not require 
culpability for the element of “serious bodily injury.”228 The court 
reasoned, in part, that the requirement does not speak to the criminality 
221 Pacheco, 666 N.E.2d at 376 (“We hold that the State was required to prove the 
substantive elements of the offense (the unlawful delivery of a controlled substance) as well 
as the enhancing factors including the proximity of the school, but the State was not required 
to prove that defendant knew or was aware of the proximity or distance of the school from 
the area where the offense was committed.”). 
222 Daniels, 718 N.E.2d at 1072 (“We adopt the reasoning of Brooks and Pacheco. 
Applying section 4-3 of the Code, we find that section 401(d) of the Act is the statute 
defining the offense of which defendant was convicted. Section 401(d) requires the State to 
prove only that defendant knowingly delivered a controlled substance (cocaine). Section 
401(d) does not refer to the enhancing factor at issue here.”). 
223 White v. State, 509 S.W.3d 307, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (addressing TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.112(b), 481.134(d) (West 2019)). 
224 Id. at 315. 
225 Id. at 310. 
226 Id. at 312. The court also reasoned that the legislature did not intend to require 
culpability as to proximity because the base offense already required knowledge. See id. at 
311 (“Section 481.134(d) makes no express mention of an additional knowledge 
requirement with respect to any of the drug free zones it identifies; it does not say a 
defendant must be aware that (or reckless with respect to whether) his delivery took place 
there. In the context of an offense that otherwise does prescribe a culpable mental state, the 
lack of express language requiring an additional mens rea with respect to other elements is 
a ‘compelling’ indication that the Legislature did not intend an additional culpable mental 
state.”). As discussed earlier, Texas’s default culpability provision applies only when an 
offense fails to require any culpability at all. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
227 White, 509 S.W.3d at 313. 
228 Rodriguez v. State, 538 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). 
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of the actor’s conduct because it merely enhances the offense of simple 
assault.229 
Courts have also endorsed absolute liability for grading provisions 
in Alaska, Colorado, and New York. For example, the Alaska Court of 
Appeals permits absolute liability for grading provisions under the 
theory that they enhance punishment, rather than define offenses.230 
In Knutsen v. State, the court interpreted an offense for indecent 
photography; the offense was a misdemeanor if the victim was an adult 
but a felony if the victim was a minor.231 The court held that no 
culpability is required as to victims’ ages,232 reasoning that “no 
culpable mental state need be proved regarding a circumstance or result 
if that circumstance or result does not alter the criminality of the 
defendant’s conduct but instead serves only to trigger a greater 
punishment for the offense.”233 Similarly, the Colorado Court of 
Appeals held that a defendant did not need to know the amount of 
methamphetamine he possessed because “[s]tatutory provisions that 
increase the felony level of an offense are generally regarded and 
treated as sentence enhancement provisions, not essential elements of 
an offense.”234 Finally, in People v. Mitchell, discussed earlier in this 
Article,235 the New York Court of Appeals suggested that culpability 
requirements should not be read into grading provisions because the 
state’s criminal code is “replete” with sentence enhancements that fail 
to prescribe mental states.236 
Indeed, most criminal codes have numerous grading provisions that 
lack express culpability requirements, just as they have numerous 
offense definitions that are silent about culpability. If anything, the 
prevalence of such statutes makes a default culpability provision like 
section 2.02(3) even more critical. The MPC drafters anticipated that 
section 2.02(3) would apply to all offense elements without prescribed 
culpability requirements, including elements in grading provisions. In 
treating grading provisions differently than offense definitions, courts 
have thus undermined section 2.02(3) and the MPC’s culpability 
229 Id. The court also reasoned that the legislature intended to dispense with a culpability 
requirement because it failed to prescribe one expressly. Id. at 628 (“[T]he . . . statute is 
conspicuously silent as to the aggravating element of ‘serious bodily injury.’”). 
230 Knutsen v. State, 101 P.3d 1065, 1069 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). 
231 Id. at 1067. 
232 Id. at 1070. 
233 Id. at 1069. 
234 People v. Scheffer, 224 P.3d 279, 288 (Colo. App. 2009). 
235 See supra text accompanying notes 195–98. 
236 People v. Mitchell, 571 N.E.2d 701, 703 (N.Y. 1991). 
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scheme. In Part III, this Article proposes rules that more clearly require 
courts to read culpability requirements into grading provisions.  
F. Summary of States’ Default Culpability Provisions
Twenty-five states have adopted culpability requirements influenced 
by the MPC.237 Only a few have adopted default culpability provisions 
that, like section 2.02(3), rigorously enforce the norm of requiring at 
least recklessness for each offense element.  
The overwhelming majority of MPC jurisdictions have failed to 
adopt default culpability provisions that are even substantially similar 
to section 2.02(3). Connecticut, Indiana, and Maine deviate the most 
from the MPC. All three states’ criminal codes lack default culpability 
provisions, meaning that culpability is required only if it is prescribed 
in a statute defining an offense.238 Arizona is marginally better because 
it has a default provision, but the state effectively imposes a default of 
absolute liability rather than recklessness.239 In the next tier are 
Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Texas, and Utah,240 followed 
by a group consisting of Alabama, Illinois, New Hampshire, and 
Ohio.241 These rankings are admittedly somewhat subjective, but these 
237 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
238 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-5 (2020); IND. CODE § 35-41-2-2 (2020); ME. STAT. 
tit. 17-A, § 34 (2019). 
239 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202(B) (2020). 
240 Colorado reads in culpability requirements only if mental states are necessarily 
involved in offenses, and courts are permitted to choose their own culpability levels. See 
supra notes 107, 111, 144 and accompanying text. Kentucky also reads in a culpability 
requirement when an offense or element necessarily involves a mental state. See KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 501.040 (West 2020). Additionally, Kentucky’s default culpability level is 
mere negligence, see id. §§ 501.010(1)–.040, and the provision does not apply to 
misdemeanors, see id. § 501.050(1) (permitting absolute liability for misdemeanors when 
the definition of the offense is silent about culpability). Kansas, Missouri, Texas, and Utah 
rate lower because their default provisions apply only when offenses fail to prescribe any 
culpability requirements at all. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5202(g) (2020); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 562.021(2) (2020); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b) (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-2-102 (West 2020). All four states also fail to generally require culpability for each
offense element. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5202; MO. REV. STAT. § 562.021; TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 6.02(a); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102.
241 Alabama ostensibly requires culpability for each offense element, but its default 
culpability provision reads in only mental states that are necessarily involved in offenses or 
elements, and courts can choose their own culpability levels. See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(b) 
(2020). Similarly, courts in Illinois and New Hampshire can choose the required culpability 
when offenses are silent. See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text. Finally, Ohio 
vaguely authorizes courts to read in a culpability requirement for “an element of an offense 
that is related to knowledge or intent or to which mens rea could fairly be applied.” OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(C) (West 2020). 
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states generally rate lower because they fail to require culpability for 
each offense element, permit courts to choose their own culpability 
requirements, or both.242  
The next tier of states consists of Montana, New York, and Oregon, 
all of which set the default culpability level at negligence rather than 
recklessness.243 Finally, four states deviate from the MPC principally 
in that they permit absolute liability based on legislative intent even for 
offenses in their criminal codes. Those states are Alaska, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, and Tennessee.244 In total, twenty-one of the twenty-
five states with culpability rules influenced by the MPC either lack 
default culpability provisions or have default rules that deviate 
significantly from section 2.02(3).  
Only four states have default culpability provisions that are 
substantially similar to section 2.02(3): Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaiʻi, 
and Pennsylvania.245 Even those four states depart in some ways from 
section 2.02(3). Most importantly, all four jurisdictions permit absolute 
liability for criminal offenses outside their codes when there is clear 
legislative intent to impose strict liability.246 The MPC, in contrast, 
generally permits absolute liability based on legislative intent only for 
civil violations.247  
To summarize, I rank the state codes surveyed in this Article as 
follows, from best to worst: 
Tier 1: Arkansas, Delaware, Hawai‘i, Pennsylvania 
Tier 2:  Alaska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Tennessee 
Tier 3:  Montana, New York, Oregon 
Tier 4: Alabama, Illinois, New Hampshire, Ohio 
Tier 5: Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Texas, Utah 
242 See supra Sections II.B and II.C. 
243 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.010(1)–.040 (West 2020); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 45-2-103(1) (2019); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2) (McKinney 2019); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 161.115(2) (2020).
244 ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.600(b)(2) (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c)(3) (West
2020); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(2), (3) (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-301(b) 
(2020). 
245 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-203(b) (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 251(b) (2020); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-204 (2020); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 302(c) (2020). 
246 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-204(c)(2) (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 251(c)(2); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-212(2) (2020); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 305(a)(2) (2020). 
Additionally, Arkansas departs from the MPC because it lacks a provision, like MPC section 
2.02(1), that generally requires culpability for each element of an offense. See ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-2-203. 
247 See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text. 
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Tier 6: Arizona 
Tier 7: Connecticut, Indiana, Maine 
Reviewing the statutory and case law in all twenty-five states, it is 
apparent that the few states that closely follow section 2.02(3) are far 
more effective in enforcing the norm of requiring recklessness for each 
offense element. When state codes deviate significantly from section 
2.02(3), courts are less likely to apply default culpability requirements 
and more prone to impose absolute liability. I therefore reach a 
different conclusion than Darryl Brown, who has said that states’ 
alterations “explain[] little of the trend of state decisions” concerning 
absolute liability.248 My survey shows that states’ culpability 
provisions can significantly influence courts’ interpretations of 
criminal statutes. Section 2.02(3) has had little effect to date, but not 
because courts choose to ignore it. Rather, section 2.02(3) has yet to be 
fully adopted even in MPC states.  
III 
PROPOSED DEFAULT CULPABILITY RULES 
This Part recommends new default culpability rules that, like section 
2.02(3), read in a requirement of recklessness for any offense element 
for which a culpability level is not stated. The proposed provisions also 
improve on the MPC in ways that prevent the problems that adopting 
states have experienced with their default culpability provisions. To 
that end, the proposed rules (1) generally require culpability for each 
offense element, (2) read in a culpability level of recklessness, 
(3) make clear that courts may read culpability requirements into
248 Brown, supra note 32, at 321. Professor Brown’s assessment was based on his review 
of decisions interpreting both sections 2.02(3) and (4) of the MPC. See id. I may reach a 
different conclusion about the significance of states’ deviations, in part, because section 
2.02(4) is beyond the scope of this Article. In future research, I hope to comprehensively 
review state decisions interpreting section 2.02(4). Preliminarily, though, I will note that 
states’ deviations from section 2.02(3) seem to have more impact on court decisions.  
Professor Brown also rated states’ default culpability provisions as part of his survey of 
criminal codes influenced by sections 2.02(3) and (4). With respect to section 2.02(3), 
Professor Brown coded each state as having a “[p]resumption to imply missing mens rea 
terms,” a “[w]eak presumption to imply missing terms,” or “[n]o presumption to imply 
missing terms.” See id. at 319 tbl.2. Professor Brown concluded that seventeen states had 
presumptions to imply missing culpability terms, three states had weak presumptions, and 
four states lacked such a provision. See id. In rating criminal codes according to whether 
they implied missing culpability terms, Professor Brown focused primarily on whether the 
codes required reading in unstated culpability requirements. My rankings, in contrast, 
evaluate how closely state codes follow section 2.02(3)’s norm of requiring at least 
recklessness for each offense element. By that measure, most states rate much more poorly 
than they did in Professor Brown’s survey.  
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grading provisions, and (4) eliminate exceptions permitting absolute 
liability based on legislative intent.  
These proposed provisions address both of the MPC’s weaknesses, 
and thus they better effectuate the Code’s norm of requiring at least 
recklessness for each element of an offense. As discussed earlier, 
section 2.02(3) has two shortcomings as applied to state criminal codes. 
First, the MPC does not address how to impose absolute criminal 
liability. The Code’s silence has led states to establish exceptions to 
their default culpability provisions for statutes indicating legislative 
intent to impose absolute liability. Second, the MPC does not make 
clear that section 2.02(3) applies to offense elements that appear in 
grading provisions. That shortcoming has also led to problems in many 
states, as several courts have permitted absolute liability for sentence 
enhancements. The following provisions would replace sections 
2.02(1) and 2.02(3): 
Culpability Requirements 
(1) To be guilty of an offense, a person must have some level of
culpability, as defined in [cross-reference to culpability
definitions], as to every objective element of the offense, except
as provided in subsection (4).
(2) * * * * 
(3) When no culpability requirement is specified with regard to an
objective element, a requirement of recklessness is applicable,
except as provided in subsection (4).249
The proposed provisions follow the MPC in generally requiring 
culpability for each offense element and in reading in a requirement 
of recklessness when an offense is silent. Importantly, though, 
subsection (1) requires culpability for each “objective element,” rather 
than each “material element.” Likewise, subsection (3) differs from 
section 2.02(3) in that it applies when a statute fails to state a culpability 
requirement for an objective element. Both changes are designed to 
refine the MPC’s terminology and to clarify that culpability is required 
for elements in grading provisions. 
249 This culpability provision is based on one proposed by the Illinois Criminal Code 
Rewrite and Reform Commission. Professor Paul Robinson was the Commission’s Reporter 
and principal drafter, Dean Michael Cahill served as Staff Director, and I served as a staff 
attorney. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, FINAL REPORT OF THE  
ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE REWRITE AND REFORM COMMISSION § 205, 12 (2003), https:// 
scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1290&context=faculty_scholarship 
[https://perma.cc/G5N8-9S4K]. 
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Section 2.02(3) has failed, in part, because the Code defines 
“element” to mean conduct, circumstances, or results that are required 
“in the definition of an offense.”250 Most adopting states have made 
matters even worse by directly limiting their default culpability 
provisions to offense definitions.251 Proposed subsection (3) avoids 
that problem because it applies whenever a culpability requirement is 
not prescribed for an objective element, regardless of where the 
element may appear. To make it even clearer that culpability 
requirements apply to grading provisions, “objective elements” should 
be defined as follows:  
“Objective elements” include such conduct, such attendant 
circumstances, and such a result of conduct as are contained in 
the definition of an offense, in a provision establishing an offense 
grade, or in a provision specifying the severity of the punishment for 
an offense. Objective elements do not include culpability 
requirements.252  
The proposed definition eradicates any possible distinction between 
offense definitions and grading provisions. As discussed earlier, such a 
distinction can be arbitrary because a criminal code can reasonably 
enhance punishments for a base offense using either a grading 
provision or a separate offense definition.253 Moreover, as a normative 
matter, criminal codes should generally require culpability with respect 
to all offense elements, including ones that aggravate conduct that is 
already criminal. Requiring culpability ensures consistency in grading 
and punishment because aggravating elements, like base elements, are 
relevant to an actor’s blameworthiness. It should matter, for example, 
whether a defendant is at least aware of the risk that he or she is 
assaulting a victim with a disability, or that he or she is selling drugs 
near a school. Such awareness makes the actor more blameworthy, thus 
justifying punishment that is more severe.254 For similar reasons, the 
250 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
251 See supra notes 212–13 and accompanying text. 
252 This definition is based loosely on one proposed by the Illinois Criminal Code 
Rewrite and Reform Commission. See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 249, § 202(1), at 11. 
253 See supra text accompanying notes 214–15. 
254 As Darryl Brown has observed, the “prevailing principle,” even in MPC jurisdictions, 
is that “no proof of culpability is required beyond that needed to ensure that an actor is not 
convicted for purely innocent conduct.” Brown, supra note 32, at 324–25 (emphasis 
omitted). Under current law, culpability requirements serve “primarily, and often 
exclusively, to distinguish innocent actors from guilty ones.” Id. at 325. The current 
approach to grading provisions is coherent even if it is misguided. As a matter of law, it 
makes sense for courts to decline to read culpability requirements into grading provisions, 
given that default culpability rules are currently limited to offense definitions. Additionally, 
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United States Supreme Court has held that facts affecting a defendant’s 
maximum punishment are offense elements and thus must be proved to 
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.255 
Finally, proposed subsections (1) and (3) both recognize exceptions 
to their general rules that culpability is required for each offense 
element and that recklessness should be read in for elements without 
stated requirements. The following proposed provision would replace 
the MPC’s absolute-liability provision, section 2.05: 
(4) When no culpability requirement is specified with regard to an
objective element, no culpability is required as to that element if
(a) the offense is a violation; or
(b) the statute defining the offense or other statutory provision
(i) imposes absolute liability for that element by using
the phrase “in fact,”
(ii) explicitly states that the offense imposes “absolute
liability” or “strict liability” as to that element, or
(iii) otherwise explicitly states a person may commit the
offense without having any level of culpability as to
that element.256
Subsection (4) recommends significant changes to the MPC’s rules 
on absolute liability. Under section 2.05, the MPC permits absolute 
liability for civil violations and for non-Code offenses for which “a 
legislative purpose to impose absolute liability . . . plainly appears.”257 
as a normative matter, courts may reasonably dispense with culpability requirements for 
elements that simply aggravate punishment for actors who are blameworthy enough to 
justify criminal liability. Nevertheless, current law is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
drafters’ vision for the MPC. The drafters anticipated that section 2.02(3) would apply to all 
elements, including ones that appear in grading provisions. See supra notes 88–90 and 
accompanying text. My own view is that grading distinctions, like those between guilt and 
innocence, should be based on actors’ relative blameworthiness. For me, regardless of the 
context, blameworthiness depends in no small part on culpability. 
255 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 496 (2000). 
256 This proposed subsection is based in part on provisions from the Maine Criminal 
Code that clarify that an offense imposes absolute liability when it uses the phrase “in fact,” 
states that it is a “strict liability crime,” or when it otherwise explicitly states that a person 
may commit the crime without a culpable mental state. See ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 34(4)(B), 
(E) (2019). Such rules are probably unnecessary in Maine because the state lacks a default
culpability provision. See ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 34 (2019). North Dakota also requires the
legislature to be explicit in dispensing with culpability requirements. See N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-02-02(2) (2019) (“If a statute or regulation thereunder defining a crime does not
specify any culpability and does not provide explicitly that a person may be guilty without
culpability, the culpability that is required is willfully.”).
257 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05(1) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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The Code also automatically grades existing absolute-liability offenses 
as mere violations.258 The proposed provision follows section 2.05 
by authorizing absolute liability for civil violations, but it treats 
criminal offenses quite differently. First, subsection (4) anticipates the 
continued use of absolute liability for serious criminal offenses, 
including offenses in the criminal code. Second, subsection (4) 
eliminates the MPC’s exception for non-Code offenses that plainly 
indicate legislative intent to impose absolute liability. Instead, the 
proposed provision authorizes absolute liability for any offense, 
including one in the criminal code, only if a statute explicitly states that 
the offense does not require culpability for an element. A statute may 
explicitly state that absolute liability is imposed for an element by using 
phrases like “absolute liability,” “strict liability,” and “in fact.” 
Importantly, subsection (4) requires an explicit statement rather than 
a showing of clear legislative intent. As discussed earlier, legislative 
intent is a vague concept that is highly susceptible to manipulation,259 
and several courts have used legislative-intent exceptions to weaken 
their states’ default culpability provisions.260 Additionally, in deferring 
to courts’ judgments in this area, criminal codes risk creating a body of 
law with culpability requirements that vary from one offense to 
another. The proposed rule, in contrast, provides a clear standard that 
guides courts and promotes uniformity in culpability requirements of 
offenses.261 In demanding explicit statutory language, subsection (4) 
also has the benefit of requiring evidence of legislative intent that 
is truly conclusive. For example, courts could no longer impose 
absolute liability by broadly characterizing an offense’s purpose and 
asserting their own policy reasons for dispensing with culpability 
258 Id. § 2.05(2)(a). 
259 See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.  
260 See supra notes 177–208 and accompanying text. 
261 The MPC’s drafters considered the possibility of requiring that non-Code offenses 
explicitly state that they impose absolute liability. The commentary for section 2.05 calls 
the approach “tempting” but asserts that it is impractical because “so much existing 
legislation that would not satisfy the test has been construed to impose strict liability.” MPC 
COMMENTARIES, PART I, supra note 20, § 2.05 cmt. 3, at 293–94. The commentary seems 
to assume that, based on “[l]egislative acquiescence in such constructions,” a code provision 
could not affect courts’ past interpretations of offenses’ culpability requirements. Id. at 294. 
Yet the MPC’s culpability provisions, including section 2.02(3), apply to such offenses, and 
thus they may supersede any previous interpretations by courts. Indeed, a legislature may 
reasonably decide to impose uniform culpability requirements for all offenses, including 
ones that have already been interpreted. The commentary’s statement is puzzling, and I do 
not give it much weight. 
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requirements.262 Similarly, subsection (4) would prevent courts from 
imposing absolute liability simply because an offense is silent about 
culpability, while related offenses are explicit.263 Instead, a court 
should ordinarily interpret silence to require the default culpability 
level of recklessness.264  
In sum, the proposed culpability rules retain and better enforce the 
MPC’s norm of requiring at least recklessness for each offense element. 
The proposed default culpability rule applies to grading provisions, and 
absolute liability may not be imposed for a criminal offense without an 
explicit statement from the legislature. If the legislature truly intends to 
dispense with a culpability requirement, it can easily do so by stating 
that the offense imposes absolute liability. 
CONCLUSION 
The MPC has played an important role in modernizing culpability 
requirements in American criminal codes. Indeed, twenty-five states 
have enacted culpability provisions influenced significantly by the 
MPC. Only four jurisdictions, however, have enacted default 
culpability rules that are even substantially similar to section 2.02(3) of 
the Code. In general, MPC states have deviated from section 2.02(3) 
by failing to require culpability for each offense element, allowing 
courts to read in culpability levels other than recklessness, permitting 
absolute liability based on legislative intent, and failing to require 
culpability for grading provisions. As a result, most states have yet to 
fully embrace the Code’s norm of requiring at least recklessness for 
each offense element. As a consequence of the shortcomings of state 
criminal codes, courts have commonly permitted absolute liability, 
affirming convictions for defendants who lack blameworthiness as to 
one or more offense elements. 
This Article has proposed new default culpability rules that better 
effectuate the Code’s norm of requiring recklessness for each offense 
element. The proposed provisions also improve on the MPC by 
instructing courts to read culpability requirements into grading 
provisions and by requiring legislatures to codify any intention to 
262 See supra notes 185–99 and accompanying text. 
263 See supra notes 200–08 and accompanying text. 
264 Ideally, states would adopt new default culpability provisions as part of larger 
criminal-code reform projects. Such projects would provide states with opportunities to 
review all criminal offenses, including ones outside criminal codes, and clarify their 
culpability requirements. If states are thoughtful in drafting offenses, they can define and 
grade crimes in ways that leave little room for doubt about culpability requirements.  
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impose absolute liability. The proposed rules have implications for 
thousands of American criminal offenses, and they better ensure that 
the criminal law’s moral condemnation is reserved for blameworthy 
defendants. As the MPC’s drafters recognized, that principle is “too 
fundamental to be compromised.”265 
265 MPC COMMENTARIES, PART I, supra note 20, § 2.05 cmt. 1, at 283. 
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